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For Chelsea

If man is not made for God, why is he only happy with God? If man is made for God,
why is he so hostile to God?

Pascal, Pensees

As one cannot deny that this is a gift of God, so one must understand that there are other
gifts of God for the children of that free Jerusalem which is above, our mother.

Augustine, De Patientia, on the courageous and
noble death of a heretic.
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ABSTRACT

Pietsch, Thomas, D. “Extra Nos but not Extraneous: Augustine’s De Natura et Gratia and
Contemporary Receptions of Augustine.” STM thesis, Concordia Seminary, 2017. 116 pp.
The relationship of nature to grace has become one of significant importance for
contemporary theology. Following the turbulent debates surrounding Henri de Lubac in the
twentieth century, theologians associated with Radical Orthodoxy have revived the importance
of the relationship in more recent years. Whether acknowledged or not, all discussions of nature
and grace owe much to Augustine, who was the first person to present a systematic discussion of
the matter in his 415 anti-Pelagian treatise, De Natura et Gratia. But readings of Augustine have
differed vastly, and have fueled debates not just around nature and grace, but also around what it
means to be Augustinian. In this thesis, I review the relationship of nature to grace in the thought
of Henri de Lubac, John Milbank, Michael Hanby, and others, as well as their readings of
Augustine. Following this, I undertake an historical, exegetical, and theological survey of De
Natura et Gratia and its context in the Pelagian debate. Rather than pit the exegetical against the
ontological, or the historical against the systematic, I show how a faithful reading of Augustine
has to pay close attention to the text while also engaging with his broader theological vision.
This enables a richer appropriation of Augustine’s theology of nature and grace for today. I find
that for Augustine the distinction between nature and grace must always be held strongly, and yet
the two must never be ultimately played off against each other in a competitive, zero-sum game,
for our corrupted nature only finds its fulfilment in the reception of external grace.

x

CHAPTER ONE
RECENT AUGUSTINIAN ACCOUNTS OF NATURE AND GRACE
The primary issue that animates this thesis is that of the relationship between nature and
grace. All people, the just and unjust alike, receive the gift of human nature from God. But grace
is that which comes on account of the death and resurrection of Christ, received through faith.
Christians have long pondered the mystery of the relationship between the two, seeking to
understand what it is that the grace of God does to our nature. Does grace rescue nature, or
simply perfect it? Is grace opposed to nature, or complimentary to nature? Does nature seek
grace, or refuse grace? If both grace and nature are God’s gifts through Christ Jesus, how can we
even distinguish them? Augustine has been pivotal to the development of this discussion within
the church. He has often been credited with arguing that man has a natural desire for God,
expressed in his celebrated phrase at the beginning of Confessions: “You arouse us so that
praising you may bring us joy, because you have made us and drawn us to yourself, and our heart
is unquiet until it rests in you.” 1 It can seem as if for Augustine we are all born on a quest for
fulfilment which is completed only when we find Christ. And yet twenty years after the
Confessions, in the Pelagian controversy, Augustine wrote with greater circumspection about the
natural desire for God. In his 412–413 De Spiritu et Littera, for example, Augustine wrote that
the desire for God comes not by nature but by the Holy Spirit. Christians “receive the Holy
Spirit, so that there arises in their minds a delight in and a love for that highest and immutable

1

Conf., 1.1.

1

good that is God, even now while they walk by faith, not yet by vision.” 2 J. Patout Burns has
argued that Augustine’s development shows a clear rejection of his earlier confidence in the
potentialities of nature. 3 Others, such as Carol Harrison, have argued for much greater continuity
in the young and late Augustine. 4
This tension in Augustine’s thought on the relationship between nature and grace is a
reflection of the tension within the Christian tradition itself. In a text often cited in the history of
the debate, St. Paul declares that “all things were created through him [Christ] and for him.”5
According to the apostle, our created natures are fully understood only in Christ, and find their
fulfilment in Christ alone, for whom we were created. It can seem as if our natures already
anticipate Christ, our telos, before the reception of the Holy Spirit or sacramental grace. But then
St. Paul in Romans attests to the limits of this approach, writing that “none is righteous, no, not
one; no one understands; no one seeks for God,” 6 and also to the Corinthians: “What no eye has
seen, nor ear heard, nor the heart of man conceived, what God has prepared for those who love
him, God has revealed to us through the Spirit.” 7 While our natures are ordered towards Christ,
St. Paul stops short of clearly proclaiming a natural desire for Christ and seems to leave open the
tension succinctly expressed by Pascal in the seventeenth century: “If man is not made for God,
why is he only happy with God? If man is made for God, why is he so hostile to God?”8 Pascal

2

Spir. et litt., 3.5.

3

J. Patout Burns, The Development of Augustine’s Doctrine of Operative Grace (Paris: Etudes
Augustiniennes, 1980).
4
See Carol Harrison, Rethinking Augustine’s Early Theology: An Argument for Continuity (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2008), especially 60–63.
5

Col. 1:16.

6

Rom. 3:10–11.

7

1 Cor. 2:9–10.

8

Blaise Pascal, Pensées and Other Writings, ed. Anthony Levi, trans. Honor Levi (Oxford: Oxford

2

was writing in one of those periods of history in which the question of nature and grace was
especially urgent and contested. The influence of Jansenism in Pascal’s day had led to a fierce
debate about the relationship between nature and grace, as well as the connected question of
what it meant to be genuinely Augustinian. Did God’s grace overwhelm the nature of those
whom he had predestined, as the Jansenists had read Augustine to affirm, or was there also a
kind of assent which our natures gave to the reception of grace, as the Jesuits argued? The
condemnation of the Jansenists first by Innocent X in 1653, and then again—more definitively—
by Clement XI in 1713 helped to bring an end to the public debate within French Catholicism.
In recent years, the relationship between nature and grace has again become pressing for
the church. Precipitated in part by the civilizational threat of National Socialism, the French
Jesuit Henri de Lubac issued a new challenge to those theologies which would separate nature
and grace so much that the gospel could no longer speak meaningfully to the world of politics.
According to de Lubac, it was this deficient turn in theology which had led to ecclesial
complicity with National Socialism and which had insulated the world of nature from the
potency of grace. De Lubac’s thought has been revived in the twenty-first century, in large part
by the Radical Orthodoxy movement. Radical Orthodoxy was born primarily in Cambridge
Anglicanism but has since extended its influence significantly within English-speaking theology
especially. The context of Radical Orthodoxy is not the Third Reich, but rather the kind of
totalitarian secularism that Benedict XVI has called “the dictatorship of relativism.” The
relegation of grace and the church to a private realm away from the supposedly neutral secular
sphere has provided context enough for a renewal of theological consideration of nature and

University Press, 2008), 8.

3

grace. But the dictatorship of relativism has threatened to strip the church even of its supposedly
private functions, thus revealing, according to Radical Orthodoxy, the impossibility of religious
neutrality for the nation-state. This context has provoked Radical Orthodoxy theologians to
recover, in Lubacian fashion, an intrinsic relationship between nature and grace. As we shall see,
the pre-eminent theologian of Radical Orthodoxy, John Milbank, has somewhat dangerously
extended de Lubac’s theological vision to an even greater synthesis between nature and grace. Of
particular interest to this thesis is Milbank’s claim to be doing this as an Augustinian. Indeed,
Milbank originally intended for the movement to be called not Radical Orthodoxy, but
Postmodern Critical Augustinianism.9 And one of the key texts in the Radical Orthodoxy book
series has been Michael Hanby’s Augustine and Modernity, a learned and provocative work
which has challenged the very definition of what it means to be Augustinian when it comes to
the relationship of nature and grace. Does Augustine anticipate a modernist, Cartesian interiority
which establishes an autonomous self without reference to God and the cosmos? Or does
Augustine provide the antidote to such an extrinsic relationship of nature to grace? Put another
way, how can Augustine’s anti-Pelagian theology of original sin be reconciled with his
supposedly optimistic understanding of man’s natural desire for God?
After reviewing these recent developments in chapter one, this thesis will then proceed to
assess contemporary invocations of Augustine on nature and grace by holding them up to the
doctor gratiae himself. As we shall see, contemporary Augustinian studies have taken a turn
away from a strictly exegetical approach to Augustine’s works, deeming this to be insufficiently
attentive to his broader vision. There are merits to this approach, but it can never be done despite

9
See John Milbank, “‘Postmodern Critical Augustinianism’: A Short Summa in Forty Two Responses to
Unasked Questions,” Modern Theology 7, no. 3 (April 1991): 225–37.

4

the text, or in a way that does not square with the text. Reading Augustine closely in light of
broader Augustinian scholarship is thus essential for any authentic Augustinian scholarship
today. This will be done in this thesis by a reading of Augustine’s anti-Pelagian treatise of 415,
De Natura et Gratia. While the relationship between nature and grace is anticipated in the
Scriptures, it was Augustine who first identified and investigated the relationship in a formal
way. All discussions of nature and grace are thus indebted to Augustine whether they
acknowledge it or not. The theme arises throughout his writings and not only in his anti-Pelagian
treatises. But it was in De Natura et Gratia, that Augustine most systematically and concertedly
addressed the relationship. Alfred Vanneste has called De Natura et Gratia “le premier de
l'histoire de la théologie chrétienne à confronter de façon formelle et directe les notions de
nature, et de grâce.” 10 And as the first treatment of this theological relationship, it remains
important for all future considerations and definitions, especially for those claiming to be
Augustinian. Given that nature and grace has become one of the more significant contemporary
theological discussions, a close reading of De Natura et Gratia promises to be a crucial test-case
in assessing the direction of Augustinian theology and scholarship today. 11 Reinhard Hütter has
written of the recent turn in Thomistic studies which has sought to place Thomas and his thought
in its Sitz im Leben, paying attention to Thomas the theologian, the tradition of Dominican

10

“The first in the history of Christian theology to formally and directly address the notion of nature and
grace.” Alfred Vanneste, Nature et Grâce Dans La Theologie Occidentale: Dialogue Avec H. de Lubac, Bibliotheca
Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovaniensium 127 (Leuven: Uitgeverij Peeters, 1996), 21–22. French translations are
my own.
11

Maarten Wisse has noted regarding recent Augustinian scholarship: “The relationship between 'nature' and
'grace' is a major issue in the theology of the twentieth century, both in the Roman Catholic and Protestant
tradition.” Maarten Wisse, “The First Modern Person? Twentieth-Century Theological Reception of Augustine,” ed.
Karla Pollmann and Otten Willemien, The Oxford Guide to the Historical Reception of Augustine (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2013), 106, 109.

5

spirituality and other influences of his time, as well as his scholarly, philosophical output. 12 In a
similar fashion, this thesis thus seeks to look at Augustine’s De Natura et Gratia and the
Pelagian controversy in situ in order to contribute more fully to the contemporary arguments
over nature and grace.
Accordingly, the final chapter of this thesis will review contemporary revisionist accounts
of Augustine on nature and grace in the light of De Natura et Gratia. It will be my contention
that while Augustine conceives of the salvific grace of Jesus Christ as coming extra nos, this
grace is never extraneous to our nature, to who we were created to be. In employing the term
extra nos I do not intend to invoke the contrast between forensic justification and infused grace,
but rather to represent how grace, for Augustine, is never inherent to our nature. Even though
both nature and grace are the gifts of God, they are different gifts. However, the surprise of grace
to our nature does not then render grace unneeded or extraneous to our nature. This is why
Augustine could summarize De Natura et Gratia as a work in which he “did not defend grace in
opposition to nature, but the grace by which nature is set free and ruled.” 13

Henri de Lubac on Nature and Grace
Henri de Lubac was born in 1896 to an aristocratic family living in Cambrai, near the
Belgian border. His family soon returned to the south of France, and de Lubac entered the French
Society of Jesus in 1913 in Lyon while still a teenager. The turbulence of the times would
significantly impact upon de Lubac’s early years and it would be fourteen years before he was

12

Reinhard Hütter, “Desiderium Naturale Visionis Dei—Est Autem Duplex Hominis Beatitudo Sive
Felicitas: Some Observations about Lawrence Feingold’s and John Milbank’s Recent Interventions in the Debate
over the Natural Desire to See God,” Nova et Vetera, English Edition 5, no. 1 (2007): 91.
13

Augustine, Retr., 2.68.42.

6

ordained. Indeed, turbulence seemed always to follow de Lubac, despite his renowned patrician
temperament. Shortly after ordination, de Lubac took up a teaching post at the Catholic
University of Lyon where he was to remain for over thirty years, albeit with significant
interruptions both due to the Second World War and to his eventual censure and suspension from
teaching by the Jesuit order. His first book, Catholicisme of 1938, presented the Catholic faith as
one dealing uniquely in paradox, eschewing those approaches which considered theological
controversies to be simple zero-sum games, lingering only in anticipation of being fully resolved
one way or the other. Of all the paradoxes in the Christian faith, the greatest of them all was that,
in Fergus Kerr’s words, “while the vision of God enjoyed by the blessed is a free gift,
unanticipated, unmerited, never owed to them, yet the desire for it is, naturally and
constitutively, in every human soul.” 14 Catholicisme thus anticipated de Lubac’s engagement
with the relationship of nature to grace. But it was in his 1946 Surnaturel that de Lubac most
directly and, as it was to turn out, controversially addressed the issue.
Kerr has written that the publication of Surnaturel “gave rise to the most acrimonious
controversy in twentieth-century Catholic theology.” 15 He describes the issue thus:
Since the sixteenth century…, allowing themselves to be shaped by opposition to
Lutheranism, Catholic theologians made so much of the distinction between nature
and grace that they lost all sense of the ‘finality’ of nature for grace—of the way in
which the human and the natural has always already been embraced within the
supernatural. 16
This fear of a Lutheran, and perhaps Jansenist, dependence on the external Word and dominical
grace had led neo-Scholastics to develop a theology of natura pura. Taking Thomas Aquinas as

14

Fergus Kerr, “Henri de Lubac,” ed. Svein Rise and Staale Johannes Kristiansen, Key Theological Thinkers:
From Modern to Postmodern (Surrey, UK: Ashgate, 2013), 202–3.
15

Kerr, “Henri de Lubac,” 204.

16

Kerr, “Henri de Lubac,” 204.

7

their guide, neo-Scholastic theologians had come to argue that the purely natural ends of man
could be defined without reference to supernatural grace. But in Surnaturel de Lubac unmasked
natura pura as a recent, novel, invention, owing more to modernism than to Thomas, much less
Augustine. De Lubac employed Augustine, as well as a revisionist reading of Thomas, to argue
for the gratuity of nature and its ordering towards grace against the defining of two different
ends—one natural, the other supernatural—of man. The task with Thomas was perhaps the
greater and more controversial given neo-Scholasticism’s dependence on him, and the testimony
of the doctor himself who had declared that “man’s happiness is twofold... One is proportionate
to human nature... The other is a happiness surpassing man's nature.” 17
The timing of Surnaturel was not accidental. In France, Marshal Pétain's Vichy regime had
ruled from 1940–45, cooperating with Nazi Germany, and collaborating with Jewish
deportations. The Catholic Church had largely fallen into line, giving its support to Pétain, so
much so that the Catholic Church of France issued an official apology in 1997. While de Lubac
had been developing the thesis of Surnaturel since his student days, it was mainly written during
the war, with Vichy France providing an urgent context to his argument. The disastrous support
for fascism among the French public and ecclesial authorities was, for de Lubac, a result of this
novel theological divorce between nature and grace. The realm of nature was given an autonomy
which isolated it from the influence of the gospel. The supernatural end of man was the church’s
business, while the natural end of man was the state’s to affect as it pleased. 18
De Lubac was quickly accused of advocating a Nouvelle Theologie and in 1950, under

17

Cited by Hütter, “Desiderium Naturale,” 81.

18
Hans Boersma, Nouvelle Théologie and Sacramental Ontology: A Return to Mystery (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2009), 88–89.

8

pressure from Rome, he was directed by the General of the Jesuits to cease teaching. De Lubac’s
works were removed from libraries, and in the same year Pope Pius XII’s encyclical Humani
Generis was promulgated with what was a widely considered to be a rebuke of de Lubac’s
thesis. 19 Pius XII defended the ability of human reason, “suis naturalibus viribus,” to attain “to a
true and certain knowledge of the one personal God.” He openly criticized those “presumptive
enough” to question the neo-Scholastic theological methodology that had flourished in recent
years. These people posed a serious danger because their approach was “concealed beneath the
mask of virtue.” These unnamed theologians seek to “destroy the gratuity of the supernatural
order, since God, they say, cannot create intellectual beings without ordering and calling them to
the beatific vision.” 20 While most people continue to read this encyclical as directed, in part,
against de Lubac, it is worth noting that de Lubac himself, along with some other supporters,
denied that it was directed against him. 21 The stripping of his teaching faculties, under Roman
influence, seems nevertheless to support the majority view.
After a period of intellectual and ecclesial exile, de Lubac’s star began to rise in the lead up
to the Second Vatican Council which he subsequently attended as a peritus and on which he
exerted no small influence. It is generally considered that it was de Lubac's rehabilitated work
which contributed to the council's pastoral constitution on the church in the world, Gaudium et
Spes, and its explication of the single, and not double, vocation of man. 22 The young, future
popes Karol Wojtyła and Joseph Ratzinger both considered de Lubac to be at the forefront of a

19

See, for instance, Wisse, “The First Modern Person?,” 110–11.

20

Pius XII, Humani Generis, 2; 10–13; 26.

21

See Hütter, “Desiderium Naturale,” 86.

22

Gaudium et Spes, 22.

9

renewal of Catholic theology which allowed de Lubac to publish more freely in his advanced
years. Still, his work remained controversial, and his appointment to the house of cardinals by
John Paul II only came about in 1983, when he was 87 years old.
There is significant evidence to suggest that as time went on, de Lubac became more
circumspect about his original treatment of nature and grace. In his earlier years, he seems to
have reacted strongly to figures like Suarez who had used Augustine to argue that grace is a gift
which is superadded to nature. 23 For de Lubac, this was in direct contradiction to the
Augustinian, “Fecisti nos ad Te,” on which many of his works can be considered a sort of
commentary. 24 All people were made “for Christ” (Col. 1:16) and it seemed not only incorrect
but dangerous to claim that our creation can be understood in any way outside of our purpose.
The young de Lubac would thus write to his friend Maurice Blondel in 1932 that the problem
with any theology of natura pura was, “how can a conscious spirit be anything other than an
absolute desire for God?” 25
The Henri de Lubac that emerges following the reinstatement of his teaching authority is in
continuity with the de Lubac of Surnaturel, and yet there is a greater circumspection about his
teaching on nature and grace. John Milbank, who, as we shall see, tends towards a more extreme
elision of nature and grace, considers the mature de Lubac to be tiptoeing around the matter in an
effort to appease the church authorities. 26 But de Lubac’s mature thought is too cogent to give

23

See Eugene TeSelle, “Grace,” ed. Karla Pollmann and Otten Willemien, The Oxford Guide to the
Historical Reception of Augustine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 1069.
24

Rudolf Voderholzer, “Henri De Lubac,” ed. Karla Pollmann and Otten Willemien, trans. David Gascoigne,
The Oxford Guide to the Historical Reception of Augustine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 1332.
25

Cited by John Milbank, The Suspended Middle: Henri de Lubac and the Debate Concerning the
Supernatural (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2005), viii.
26
Milbank, The Suspended Middle, 8. See also p. 104 where Milbank refers to de Lubac’s “formal
capitulation to papal authority.”

10

full credence to Milbank’s view. This thought is expressed essentially in two works both
published in 1965: Augustinisme et Théologie Moderne, and then a work entitled Le Mystère du
Surnaturel. Both of these books reworked material of Surnaturel suggesting a softening of his
1946 bombshell.
In these works, de Lubac does not revoke his earlier criticisms of neo-Scholasticism. But
he does show a greater sensitivity to the dangers of the opposite pole, the Augustinianism of
Baius and Jansenius. Their misguided attempt to stress the telos of nature in grace had led them
to treat grace as if it was owed by God to our human nature on account of the creative act. 27 For
de Lubac, this was a fatal attempt to resolve the “fundamental paradox” of man’s relationship to
God which is characterized on the one hand by a natural longing for fulfillment in God; but on
the other hand by a reception of this fulfillment not as a matter of justice or inevitability but as an
act of sheer and unexpected grace, a tension which Augustine had understood well. 28 The de
Lubac of 1965 could articulate a greater awareness of the dangers of resolving this tension in
either direction, recognizing that a metaphysic of complete union would confuse what needed to
be distinguished. And so he could write that between the Christian soul and God, “there is
always a union, not absorption (whether in one sense or the other). It is, if you wish, a unification
and not an identification. It involves mutual love even though all the initiative comes from
God.” 29
In the light of what is to come in this study, it is worth quoting de Lubac a little more in

27

Henri de Lubac, Augustinianism and Modern Theology, trans. Lancelot Sheppard (New York: Herder and
Herder, 1969), 37–38.
28

Henri de Lubac, The Mystery of the Supernatural, trans. Rosemary Sheed (New York: Herder, 1967), 21.

29
From de Lubac’s 1965 essay “Mysticism and Mystery,” cited by Adam G. Cooper, Naturally Human,
Supernaturally God: Deification in Pre-Conciliar Catholicism (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2014), 158.
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this regard, here on the dangers of a Platonic identification of nature with grace.
One must... be careful to correct—if not wholly to avoid—the neo-Platonist
metaphors of flux, of gushing, of ‘effluence’, of emanation, of soaking into things.
God is not, as one might think from some Platonist expressions also taken up by
Denys, a generosity pouring himself out; it is at best inadequate to see him simply as
that ‘fundamental generosity’ which must mean, for the Absolute, simply the fact of
being essentially communicable; or that kind of generosity which is no more than a
de-sacralized charity. Those who, in order to avoid ‘contingentist theories’ which
might tend to anthropomorphism, accept rather too readily Platonist or Plotinian
theories as if despairing in advance of purifying any personalist theory by the laws of
analogy, are in danger of steering from Charybdis on to Scylla. No theory will
dispense with the need for correction by analogy. 30
Just as Augustine’s “Fecisti nos ad Te”—which de Lubac invoked at the beginning of
Augustinianism and Modern Theology—provided a check against treating grace as a mere
superaddition to nature, so too de Lubac looked to Augustine for assistance in preventing the full
elision of nature with grace. As he wrote in The Mystery of the Supernatural, citing Jacques
Maritain:
Despite all that has been said to the contrary, we must certainly maintain that ‘St
Augustine taught as clearly as possible the ontological value of the distinction
between nature and grace’; ‘he clearly affirmed that distinction even for the state of
innocence’. The definitely and intrinsically supernatural character of divine adoption
is one of the fundamental elements in his teaching; it is expressed there so clearly,
and so insistently, that we should be astonished to find that it has not always been
recognized. 31
De Lubac is often remembered for his concern that the idea of natura pura led to a
misconception of man and a severing of grace from the supposedly privatized natural world. 32
But he ought equally to be read for this wariness of those who fail to properly distinguish
between nature and grace. Hans Boersma rightly notes that “we need to take seriously these anti-

30

Lubac, The Mystery of the Supernatural, 306–7.

31

Lubac, The Mystery of the Supernatural, 26–27.

32
For example, see Tracey Rowland, Culture and the Thomist Tradition: After Vatican II (London:
Routledge, 2003), 94.
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Platonic comments... [De Lubac’s] desire to safeguard both the concrete character of the love of
the triune God and his freedom in creating and redeeming was unambiguous.” 33 Indeed, de
Lubac could, in 1965, even express openness to the idea of natura pura provided it was
employed to safeguard the gratuity of grace. 34

Radical Orthodoxy
Henri de Lubac’s influence has experienced a resurgence in recent years. Theologians
engaging with postmodern thought have found in de Lubac an ally against modernism and
dualism, especially in his criticism of the theology of natura pura and of the separation of nature
and grace as drastically different realities. The Radical Orthodoxy movement has, in particular,
been drawn to de Lubac as anticipating their own anti-modernist concerns.
The founding text of Radical Orthodoxy, John Milbank’s 1990 Theology and Social
Theory, famously begins with the statement: “Once, there was no ‘secular’.” 35 Milbank then goes
on to explicate the thesis at the heart of Radical Orthodoxy, namely that the purely secular is a
fiction when it is understood as some sort of neutral space in which religious forces have no
hold. Just as the theologians of Radical Orthodoxy have sought to refute the idea of the purely
secular over and against the sacred in the political sphere, so too in the realm of anthropology
they have sought to reject the idea of the purely natural, denying that man can in any meaningful
way be understood, or even exist, without reference to grace. The context of the movement is
instructive here, arising as it has at a time not just of decline but fall for European churches.
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What once stood at the heart of the lives of all Europeans has been cleared away to make room
for a purportedly rational, neutral public square. Just as importantly for Radical Orthodoxy,
given its intensely academic focus, it has arisen at a time when theology is given little attention
outside its own circles, and when theology departments at universities are at best consigned to
the margins of public discourse. It does not require much skill to detect a level of accordant
frustration and stridency, particularly in Milbank’s tone, whom Reinhard Hütter has complained
is often callously dismissive of opponents. 36
The influences of Radical Orthodoxy are diverse. Perhaps its key inheritance is the
metaphysical achievement of Thomas and the analogia entis in contrast to the univocity of being
most prominently espoused by Duns Scotus and, later, Suarez. According to Radical Orthodoxy,
this Scotist, flattened ontology has tended to win the day in modernity, leaving no room for
participation in the transcendent. Instead, we have been left with a kind of self-sufficient
immanence, only related to God as like an Aristotelian accident. Radical Orthodoxy theologians
sometimes describe this mistaken metaphysic as a two-storeyed universe with the realms of
nature and grace, or Creator and creation, existing independently of each other. Their
relationship is not one of mutual participation, but ultimately one of competition. To change the
metaphor slightly, it is as if modernity conceived of God and creatures as beings on the same
plane, whereby ceding authority to one would challenge the authority of the other. One of the
more important texts for our thesis, about which we will have more to say shortly, is John
Milbank’s 2005 The Suspended Middle: Henri de Lubac and the Debate Concerning the
Supernatural. In an illustrative passage there, Milbank explains the kind of irresolvable problem
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that this competitive, Scotist ontology leaves us with: “namely, how does the pure nature receive
the gift—of its own volition or by the gift as standing over against its natural ungivenness? The
first solution is Pelagian; the second, in Lutheran fashion, sees grace as overriding our
freedom.” 37 Putting to one side Milbank’s mischaracterization of Lutheran theology, Milbank’s
point is that if nature and grace meet on this competitive plane, nature’s victory would be
Pelagian and grace’s victory would be “Lutheran”—whereby grace is “no more a gift than is a
brick wall we might inadvertently run into.” 38 But in the Radical Orthodoxy invocation of
Aquinas’ analogia entis, both of these approaches get it wrong because they begin with a false,
Manichaean-like separation of God from creation, of grace from natura pura. 39 Put in other
words, how can we meaningfully talk of God giving a gift to an entity without understanding that
the entity itself is a gift of God? This is why Milbank can say that,
[T]he divine gift ... is a gift to no-one, but rather establishes creatures as themselves
gifts, the divine gift passes across no neutral abyss, no interval of uncertainty during
which one waits, with bated breath, to see if the destiny of a gift will be realised. 40
Thus this separation is not only false, but ultimately nonsensical. For any attempt to define man
without reference to the giftedness of his very being, nor his divine telos, ends up doing violence
to reason. Milbank put it this way in his 1999 contribution to the collection of essays entitled
Radical Orthodoxy:
[I]f the truth of nature lies in its supernatural ordination, then reason is true only to
the degree that it seeks or prophesies the theoretical and practical acknowledgement
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of this ordination which, thanks to the fall, is made possible again only through divine
incarnation. 41
Theology which neglects this ordination of nature thus even ends up being “nihilistic” because it
denies the ordered-ness of the cosmos according to God’s creative gift. 42
But beyond Aquinas and his warring children stands Augustine as a pre-eminent influence
for the movement which, as we have noted, was originally called ‘Postmodern Critical
Augustinianism.’ Milbank finds in Augustine a necessary rejection of the competitive plane,
providing instead a “Christian infinitization of the absolute.” This in turn provides a “Christian
theological ontology” in which all of nature and creation exists solely by God’s sustaining grace
and has no meaning or even existence in itself. In Augustine then, theology can learn again to
relinquish things like “notions of presence, of substance, the priority of idea over copy and cause
over effect, of a subject with a rational essence, and of Being as ‘mirrored’ by this rational
essence” and instead to insist on others such as “transcendence, participation, analogy, hierarchy,
teleology.” 43 All of these terms become laden with a specific meaning in Radical Orthodoxy, but
Milbank expressed the animating idea in his fifteenth thesis of his programmatic 1991 essay:
One way to try to secure peace is to draw boundaries around ‘the same’, and to
exclude ‘the other’; to promote some practices and disallow alternatives. Most
polities, and most religions, characteristically do this. But the Church has
misunderstood itself when it does likewise ... Christianity should not draw
boundaries. 44
While now is not the time to explore the problems that Milbank opens himself up to, passages
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like this hardly make it surprising that he has been charged with panentheism. 45
The Suspended Middle
Milbank directly engages the theology of de Lubac on nature and grace in The Suspended
Middle, to which we shall now turn. He sees himself as appreciatively appropriating de Lubac
while also extending his thought to those places where he was pointing, but which he did not
necessarily explicate. But, crucially, this depends upon reading de Lubac’s mature thought as
compromised by “concessions to the Church hierarchy” following Humani Generis, and not as
the authentic concerns of one grown more circumspect to his earlier reactions against natura
pura. 46 This interpretation allows Milbank to build on the early de Lubac’s critique of the
dualistic divide of nature and grace without incorporating his later checks.
When Milbank thus looks at de Lubac’s stress on the paradoxical nature of man’s
relationship to God, his reading begins to look more panentheist than de Lubac:
For de Lubac, the enigma ran equally in two opposite directions. On the one hand, the
extra-ordinary, the supernatural, which is always manifest within the Creation, is
present at the heart of the ordinary: it is “precisely the real”—or “the real in its
precision”—as [film director Robert] Bresson put it. On the other hand, the ordinary
and given always at its heart points beyond itself and in its spiritual nature aspires
upwards to the highest. Grace is always kenotic; the natural is always elevated but not
destroyed. Yet by a symmetrical paradox the ‘more’ that is demanded by nature can
only be received from God as a gift. 47
Milbank’s use of the word “always” here brings a totalizing quality not as obviously present in
de Lubac. It should be remembered here that de Lubac did not consider Humani Generis—which
had denounced those who say, in a rather totalizing fashion, that God “cannot create intellectual
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beings without ordering and calling them to the beatific vision”—to be directed against his work.
De Lubac’s later work suggests that he wanted to clarify why he felt Humani Generis did not
directly address his thought. But Milbank interprets Humani Generis to be accurately
summarizing and criticizing de Lubac, albeit while being completely wrong in its judgment.
This reading requires Milbank to read the 1965 treatises of de Lubac as being unduly
written “in deference to Humani Generis.” 48 And so Milbank takes his departure from de Lubac,
when de Lubac says in The Mystery of the Supernatural that the longing of the soul is “born of a
lack” and does not involve any participation in God, “even initially or distantly.” 49 Milbank’s
participationist ontology leads him to read around de Lubac here. So too when de Lubac claims
that while man is left after the fall still with the imago Dei, he nevertheless is lacking the
participation in God that only grace can give. For Milbank, de Lubac is here departing from
Augustine, whom Milbank invokes to support his participationist ontology: “For Augustine
himself, by contrast [to de Lubac], the imago Dei that always remains involves some degree of
participation in the Godhead, if not the participation of grace, and it is destined to rise, by grace,
into a similitudo of God.” 50 Indeed, for Milbank, Augustine is the model theologian when it
comes to refusing any place to notions like natura pura. 51 But because de Lubac was “seeking to
square his views with Humani Generis,” de Lubac missed the opportunity to develop his
theology in a participationist direction, and instead “reduces the natural desire for the
supernatural to a negative lack and denies that it in any way positively anticipates the
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supernatural end.” 52 And so Milbank takes the opportunity to fill what was lacking, so to speak,
in de Lubac:
Cosmos requires the government of spirit; spirit is destined to be engraced; therefore
in one sense every creature is already for and by grace. After all, how could charis be
a less original or plenitudinous gift than esse? 53
Milbank takes de Lubac away from a salvific focus, to a kind of cosmological, neo-Platonist
perspective—the very perspective that de Lubac himself had warned against. As Milbank puts it
in another work, “Christological and atonement doctrines... [are] theoretically secondary to
definitions of the character of the new universal community or Church.” 54
In this complex but important conversation Augustine is thus controversially enlisted to
help re-Platonize theology and to supersede the centrality of Christ Jesus as mediator between
God and man. In seeking to move beyond the univocity of being, Milbank sees the only options
for modern theology as either going the way of the French, who tend to supernaturalize the
natural, or the way of the Germans, who tend to naturalize the supernatural. 55 There are no other
options for Milbank, because every other option imposes a boundary. And in that choice,
Milbank sides with the “French.”
Augustine and Modernity
Michael Hanby, a former student of Milbank, has written the most systematic treatment of
Augustine from a Radical Orthodoxy perspective. While Milbank tends to deal in allusions to
Augustine and Augustinianism that can be difficult to assess, Hanby provides a reading of
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Augustine that can more readily be evaluated. Nevertheless, Hanby can tend towards the opaque.
At the beginning of his 2003 Augustine and Modernity—a title which echoes de Lubac’s
Augustinianism and Modern Theology—he anticipates a number of criticisms people may have
of his work:
There is something here to dissatisfy nearly everyone. Theologians will likely think
this book too philosophical; philosophers will likely think the reverse. Historians may
well complain that it is insufficiently historical and all might find it insufficiently
exegetical. 56
This lack of a “historical” and “exegetical” treatment of Augustine can indeed be problematic. In
a critique of Hanby’s book which we shall look at later on, Maarten Wisse stated: “Not only does
Hanby not practice historical and exegetical analysis, he would not even be able to do it, as it
contradicts Radical Orthodoxy’s ontology.” 57 In response, Hanby suggested that Wisse was
missing the point, as Augustine and Modernity sought not to deny the importance of historical
and exegetical analysis, but rather to ask whether contemporary Augustinian studies held to
ontological presuppositions which prevented it from adequate historical analyses. 58 In some
ways, the thrust of this present thesis is to hold up Radical Orthodoxy’s Augustine to the
exegetical light which it is at risk of ignoring.
But that is not to say that Hanby’s work is evasive. His goal in Augustine and Modernity is
to show that the two are not friends, and that Augustine actually provides us with a critique of
modernity, Radical Orthodoxy-style. 59 This stands at odds with a good deal of Augustinian
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interpretation in the last two centuries. The case for Augustine as the first modern man has been
made by thinkers as diverse as Adolf von Harnack and Charles Taylor. The former tended to
celebrate this thesis, while Taylor has recently lamented it—that Augustine’s focus on the
interior self inaugurated a transition to a modern, subjective self which Descartes later
explicated. For Taylor, “Augustine shifts the focus from the field of objects known to the activity
itself of knowing; God is to be found here.” 60 The Yale theologian Robert Calhoun was another
who presented a proto-Cartesian Augustine, in a relatively even-handed fashion:
In several works, early and late, Augustine offers the self as a first instance of what
can be certainly known. If I find myself able to raise questions as the skeptics do
about the possibility of having knowledge of objective reality, I find that in raising
the question I am tacitly affirming my own existence as the questioner, the doubter…
Si fallor sum [If I am deceived, I am]—he put it into a little aphorism. 61
One major contemporary critic of this Augustine, whom Hanby raises as an interlocutor, is Eric
Alliez. Alliez, in a rather bold fashion, sees this Augustinian definition of the self without
reference to God as ultimately pointing towards nihilism. In Hanby’s paraphrase of Alliez’s
position, “the Christian and particularly Augustinian conception of the relationship between
Creator and creature actually produces its mirror opposite and subordinates the Creator, and
everything else, to the creature.” 62 To quote Alliez directly,
[T]he divine economy henceforth implies a principle of dissociation, a specific break
between what is beyond and what is here below, which, far from fulfilling itself in a
negative logic with regard to the terrestrial city, in the end favors the autonomy of the
temporal. 63
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When all theological reflection is filtered through the self, as Augustine is charged with
advocating, then all theology, and God himself, is subordinated to the self. From here it is a short
step to the modernist form of atheism in which the self is the only certain thing in a world of
doubt. Hanby refers to this as a “Niebuhrian” economy of separation which, as we have seen
with Milbank, is a bête noir of Radical Orthodoxy, and crucially important for all discussions of
the relationship between nature and grace.
Hanby comes to the defense of Augustine by arguing that far from envisioning an economy
of separation, Augustine established an “economy of beauty” in which all things are made
intelligible together, in the one economy, and not in separate orders. In this regard, Hanby
praises Taylor for intuiting this direction in Augustine: “Taylor rightly notes that Augustinian
interiority, constituted in a relationship to God more intimately related to the self than itself, is in
a sense radically exterior.” 64 But while Taylor does not develop this further, Hanby sees this
exteriority as a key to establishing Augustine as anti-modern. According to Hanby, Augustine
envisioned a kind of subjectivity which was fundamentally ordered towards objectivity. This can
be seen in the Confessions where Augustine declares that God is “interior intimo meo”—“more
inward than my most inward part”, or “closer to me than myself.” 65 Augustine’s introspection
thus actually moves him not to the knowledge of his self, but to the love and knowledge of God,
encompassing a paradox whereby subjectivity leads to objectivity and indeed is necessary for
objectivity, as it is only through self-knowledge that one can be led outward to the true
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knowledge of God. 66 This cannot, however, be understood to mean that Augustine advocated a
panentheistic, God-within, glorification of nature. As obvious a point as that may seem to be, it
has eluded Charles T. Mathewes who writes concerning Augustine’s interior intimo meo:
The human fault lies in attempting to deny our nature; to be fully (and properly)
natural beings would be to return to a state of grace. Like the knowing subject, the
acting subject finds its place in the world and before God because it finds the world
and God at its heart. 67
Such a perspective actually falls into the very danger that Alliez warned about, whereby God is
subjected to the self on a pious-sounding road to nihilism.
Hanby’s reading of Augustinian exteriority has recently been supported by the work of the
Notre Dame Augustinian scholar John Cavadini. Cavadini has persuasively shown that for all the
modern talk of Augustine and the self, there is no equivalent in Latin for the English word “self.”
While Augustine does refer to things like the interior homo, the common translation “inner self”
suggests a non-sensory interior place instead of a full-blooded and full-bodied man. 68 The effect
of translations like these is to suggest a stable, independent subject which can be defined without
reference to God. Cavadini rightly suggests something very different is going on in Augustine:
In fact, the closer one examines the imagery which Augustine uses to express the
content of self-awareness, the more one becomes convinced that he does not use it to
describe a stable reality called “the self” that becomes more and more clearly visible
the purer one’s interior vision becomes, but rather something that defies reification.
The content of self-awareness, for those truly self-aware, is much more disturbing
and mysterious, more exciting and hopeful, more treacherous and full of risk. 69
Indeed if there could possibly be something like “the self” in Augustine, it would actually best
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denote the prideful soul which vainly attempts to assert its independence from God. 70 In a similar
fashion, Rowan Williams writes of Augustine's anthropology in the Confessions: “The
abandonment shown in humility, falling down upon the prostrate Christ, the dead Christ, is of a
piece with the abandonment that is central to the whole enterprise of the Confessions, that is, the
repudiation of the ‘finished’ self.” 71 While Cavadini’s study came out some years after Augustine
and Modernity, it is nevertheless anticipated by Hanby who sees that the Cartesian genealogy
actually stretches back to the Stoics, who also influenced Pelagius. For Hanby, then, the Pelagian
controversy can yield important fruit, because it embodies the clash between a proto-Cartesian,
Pelagian economy of separation and an Augustinian economy of participation, providing a way
to clarify the relationship between nature and grace.
Hanby writes that despite its prominence in the Christian theological tradition, it is not
immediately clear “just why the Pelagian controversy was controversial. … [B]oth ancient and
modern readers alike have tended to abstract Augustine's doctrine of grace from its intellectual
and ontological context to treat it merely as a function of the anti-Pelagian polemics.” 72 We here
can see a part of Hanby’s rationale for not being sufficiently “exegetical.” Concern merely with
the polemics of controversy can, according to Hanby, obscure the deeper ontological issues at
play. And so Hanby is critical of the approach of J. Patout Burns, one of the more thorough
scholars of Augustine’s doctrine of grace. In a critique that bears witness to wider trends in
Augustinian studies, Hanby criticizes Burns’ “genetic” approach for not addressing what is latent
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in Augustine’s mind, favouring simply “textual output,” and even then failing to consider the
non-Pelagian texts. 73 This somewhat needless attack is representative of a similarly needless
divide in contemporary Augustine scholarship which this thesis hopes to overcome. Some of the
most compelling, recent studies of Augustine have abandoned the methodology of close reading
in favour of attending to the Augustinian vision in a broader sense. 74 To take one of the more
striking examples, the most recent biography of Augustine, which Rowan Williams has said is
“capable of doing for a new generation a great deal of what Peter Brown's epochal biography did
half a century ago,” 75 is Miles Hollingworth’s Saint Augustine of Hippo: An Intellectual
Biography. For all of Hollingworth’s ingenuity and insight, he is more focussed on his own
subjective meditations on the sweep of Augustinian thought in dialogue with the history of
philosophy and theology than he is with an exegetical, chronological approach to his subject.
Thus worthy and even exciting new treatments of Augustine, such as Hanby’s, are played off
against the previous generation’s careful and deliberate scholarship, such as Burns’. And while
the breadth of vision of this new trend is fascinating and perhaps does reveal the lower horizons
of some Augustinian scholarship, the need to attend to the text of Augustine cannot be surpassed.
The structure of this thesis is an attempt to bring these two types of Augustinian studies into
conversation with one another.
Nevertheless, Hanby tends to pit the polemical and historical context against his own
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ontological context. To correct this tendency towards the former among Augustinian scholarship,
Hanby singles out Augustine’s De Trinitate as crucial for discerning Augustine’s ontological
vision.
The failure of much of modern scholarship to avail itself of this text is indicative of
its failure to come to grips with the ontological stakes of the question—a fact which
suggests in turn a great ontological distance between most contemporary scholars and
Augustine. 76
His reading of De Trinitate leads Hanby to a participatory ontology which he sees as providing a
way past the debates among scholars around the question “whether grace or nature.” According
to this zero-sum game, to emphasize nature is Pelagian, while to emphasize grace in an
Augustinian fashion is to diminish what is natural and human. As an example, Hanby quotes
disapprovingly Rebecca Harden Weaver. “The subordination of the human will and action to
grace calls into question the degree to which human actions are genuinely human.” 77 But this is
to make a fundamental error, attempting to understand the Pelagian controversy within an
economy of separation. Any ontological vision which conceives of natura pura and extrinsic
grace as separate realities has already, according to Hanby, ceded the victory to Pelagianism, no
matter which reality comes out on top. Simply to conceive of a human nature somehow “outside”
of the Triune God is to be already Pelagian. Despite his occasionally dismissive tone (albeit
nothing compared to Milbank) this is a significant and provocative thesis, because it leads Hanby
to conclude that much of what has been concluded among scholars as the Augustinian
achievement in the Pelagian controversy—namely, the triumph of grace over nature—is “a form
of Augustinianism which is actually Pelagian.” 78
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As Hanby has put it in a more recent chapter, Augustine in the Pelagian debate “is adamant
against parceling out discrete divine and human contributions to the good human act.” 79 The
point of the Pelagian controversy was not, then, a triumph of grace over nature, but rather a:
cosmological triumph. Implicitly it vindicated and instituted nature as the gratuitous
creation of the transcendent God against the machinations of the pyr teknikon, the
self-crafting fire of stoicism, for which any interaction between human and divine
must be a “tensional” interchange between immanent forces. 80
And at the heart of this triumph stands the incarnation and the hypostatic union which has
resulted in a reconfiguring of “cosmology as creation, creation as soteriology, soteriology as
aesthetics and aesthetics as doxology.” 81 Like much of the Radical Orthodoxy project, then, the
incarnation is looked to as carrying salvific weight in its uniting of the natural and the
supernatural in the one person Jesus Christ in whom salvation is fully revealed. The incarnation
is a cosmological event which brings about the redemption of the whole natural order in the body
of Christ. And so Hanby can say that Christ’s manifestation “already implies participation in
Augustine.” 82 Faith is given very little attention in Radical Orthodoxy, and Hanby points to the
reasons why. “The distinction between manifestation and apprehension within Augustine's
aesthetic soteriology is an artificial one.” Creation is reformed “within the unity of Christ's
body.” 83 The incarnation brought about an “aesthetic soteriology” whose ramifications are
cosmological. Salvation is the restoration of the aesthetic order and harmony of creation manifest
to us through “participation in the unity of Christ’s humanity and divinity” rather than a kind of
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personal faith. 84 The salvific body of Christ is then not so much a discreet entity to be
apprehended by the autonomous believer, but rather the embodied restoration of creation.
While it can be too simplistic to claim that some theologies emphasize the incarnation over
the crucifixion, or vice versa, it is nevertheless inescapable that the incarnation in Radical
Orthodoxy is of central focus. It facilitates a theology of the cosmological restoration of all
creation in Christ. This is not to say that Hanby’s Augustine is a universalist. He writes that
Augustine see that “all are members incorporate in the bodies of either of the two Adams,
citizens of either of the two cities characterized by their respective objects of worship and subject
to either of the two mediators.” 85 But it is the hypostatic union, and not the blood of the crucified
Christ, which is the most decisive event for the salvation of creation. For example, when Hanby
refers to Augustine’s De Natura et Gratia—the treatise that will be at the heart of our next
chapter—and his concern that nature construed in Pelagian terms “renders the cross of Christ
void,” Hanby expands this to say that nullifying the cross “will somehow nullify creation's
participation in the divine love and, conversely, that a rupture in participation will rupture
Christ's mediation.” He goes on: “Indeed it is not too strong to say, with proper qualifications,
that soteriology is for Augustine simply the fulfillment and intensification of creation.” 86
Thus Hanby can refer to “Augustine's elision of creation and sanctification into a single
economy” and can seek to understand not just gratia but also natura in a Christological way,
affirming St Paul’s proclamation that “all things were created through him [Christ] and for
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him.” 87 Nature is not “ours”, not an autonomous self-enclosed res, but rather it is God’s in Christ
Jesus. In support of this reading, Hanby appeals in part to de Lubac, although not in such a
comprehensive way as Milbank. He notes how de Lubac provides historical support for this
reading of the Pelagian controversy:
Interestingly, in telling contrast to the Protestant attempt to recruit anti-Pelagian
Augustine to underscore the difference between nature and grace, de Lubac cites a
tradition of criticism of pre-Thomist Augustinianism, dating back to Albert Magnus,
alleging Augustine's failure to distinguish significantly between nature and grace, the
very division he is often thought to have instituted. 88
But like Milbank, he sees his project as furthering what de Lubac had pointed to but not
developed. “Even Henri de Lubac, who recognized so clearly that Pelagianism is really about the
natural and its supernatural consummation, does not sufficiently elaborate this point.” 89 While
Milbank’s The Suspended Middle was written two years after Augustine and Modernity, Hanby
offers a reading of de Lubac consistent with his teacher Milbank’s preferencing of the earlier de
Lubac and seeing the later de Lubac as kowtowing to the authorities.
Whether Hanby focusses on ontological issues to illuminate Augustine or despite him is the
important question here. Radical Orthodoxy tends to see ontological issues as lying behind all
controversies and errors, and Hanby is no exception. Maarten Wisse, whose criticisms of Hanby
we shall attend to later, has summarized Radical Orthodoxy’s approach:
The target of Radical Orthodoxy's reception of Augustine is what they call Western
nihilism, the idea of a technological world of self-constituting objects with no uniting
vision, no dependence on God, and the Cartesian subject as the master of the
universe. The Augustine received in an attempt to overcome this nihilism is a rather
Platonic Augustine, in which the world is united in its ontological participation in
God. Everything that is, is ‘gift’, taking up Augustine’s admission of this title of the
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Holy Spirit (Hanby). Likewise, Augustine's order of love, which in Radical
Orthodoxy takes the shape of an erotic desire for the other, plays a major role, as it
marks all reality as a mutual giving rather than self-subsistence (Milbank). 90
Was the Pelagian controversy essentially a clash of metaphysics? While we are postponing
analysis to the final chapter, Sigridur Gudmarsdottir is one reviewer who is wary of Hanby’s
dependence on De Trinitate as a lens through which to read everything else. “I suspect Hanby's
method of synthesizing De Trinitate, and interpreting all other works of Augustine in the light of
this synthesis, is an oversimplifying of the rich complexity of Augustine's thought.” 91 Hanby’s
can seem to be an unsatisfyingly myopic reading which looks past Augustine’s insistence upon
the absolute ontological difference between God and the world. And yet, as we shall see, his
further clarifications in a 2007 colloquium reveal Hanby to be a much more nuanced reader than
Milbank and, in a similar way to de Lubac, keen to acknowledge that the distinction between
nature and grace is essential to any cogent understanding of Augustine. This issue, along with
that of the zero-sum game between nature and grace, the economy of participation, a
cosmological rather than personal soteriological focus, and of the incarnation as decisive for
salvation, will be a part of the mix as we look at Augustine himself.
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CHAPTER TWO
AUGUSTINE’S DE NATURA ET GRATIA
We now look to Augustine to assess his approach to nature and grace in light of the
aforementioned discussion. That need not, and must not, require vainly and anachronistically
attempting to read contemporary concerns back into Augustine. We will look at Augustine on his
own terms, but nevertheless with an ear attuned to his discussion of the problems Henri de
Lubac, and Radical Orthodoxy, have raised. The final chapter will then bring these voices
together.
The goal of this approach is to use De Natura et Gratia as a case study for reading and
assessing Radical Orthodoxy’s Augustinianism and Michael Hanby’s approach to the Pelagian
controversy in particular. As we have noted, Hanby has been critical of J. Patout Burns’
“genetic” approach to Augustine which focuses narrowly on Augustine’s “textual output” rather
than on the broader systematic nature of his thought. 1 Others, like Charles T. Mathewes, have
made similar statements. 2 While there is much to be said for attending to Augustine’s theological
ontology, any Augustinianism worth its weight must deal with, and to some extent be measured
by, the “textual output” in a comprehensive way. The 415 anti-Pelagian treatise De Natura et
Gratia is, as Alfred Vanneste has said, “le premier de l'histoire de la théologie chrétienne à
confronter de façon formelle et directe les notions de nature, et de grâce.” 3 And as the first
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treatment of this theological relationship, it remains important for all future considerations and
definitions, especially for those claiming to be Augustinian. In this treatise, Augustine also dealt
with many of the relevant aspects of the debate, including a particular focus on the inability of
man to reach for salvation in Christ. Other early anti-Pelagian treatises such as De Spiritu et
Littera and De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione, while relevant, do not have the same
importance for this study. 4 So while we will have opportunity to refer to them, it is De Natura et
Gratia, in response to Pelagius’ De Natura, that will be front and center in reading Augustine’s
understanding of the relationship between nature and grace.
Robert F. Evans has noted that it was De Natura et Gratia which marked the point at which
the Pelagian controversy became a controversy. 5 Previously, Augustine had dealt more
considerately with Pelagius and while he still refrained from naming Pelagius in De Natura et
Gratia (“for fear that he would be offended and become more difficult to heal” 6), his
denunciatory tone indicates a shift in intensity. 7 Peter Brown has suggested that Augustine did
not mention Pelagius by name in De Natura et Gratia out of a reticence to offend Pelagius’
influential patrons, however the desire to persuade Pelagius without turning him off seems more
plausible. 8 Not only did Augustine mention this as the cause in Letter 186, but also in a treatise
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Nevertheless it should be noted that in Retr. 11.63 Augustine writes that he considers De Spiritu et Littera to
be his most fundamental critique of Pelagius.
5

Robert F. Evans, Pelagius: Inquiries and Reappraisals (New York: Seabury, 1968), 70.

6

Ep. 186.1. In the text of De Natura et Gratia itself, Augustine somewhat sympathetically attributes his
unnamed opponent’s opinions to a "burning zeal" (zelo ardentissimo) against those who lazily attributed their sin to
nature and not will. Nat. et gr. 1.1.
7

This tone coexists with Augustine nevertheless attempting to show his areas of agreement with Pelagius.
See Lydia Wegener, Mathijs Lamberigts, and David Lambert, “De Natura et Gratia,” in The Oxford Guide to the
Historical Reception of Augustine, ed. Karla Pollmann and Otten Willemien, vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2013), 350. Note also Augustine’s calling Pelagius, “O frater.” Nat. et gr. 20.22.
8

Peter Brown, Religion and Society in the Age of Saint Augustine (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 217; cf.

32

of the following year, De Gestis Pelagii. There he writes that he did not mention the author of De
Natura by name, “judging that he would succeed better if, by safeguarding their friendship, he
dealt tactfully with the honour of the man for whose writings he no longer had to have
consideration.” 9 This approach has further been confirmed by one of the Divjak letters, recently
re-discovered. In Letter 19*, Augustine wrote to Jerome in 416 regarding Pelagius, “I would
wish to correct him as a friend, something I still desire, I confess, and I do not doubt that your
Holiness also wishes it.” 10 But that does not qualify the seriousness of the matter for Augustine.
According to Augustine in his Letter 186 to Paulinus of Nola, it was upon reading De Natura
that he came to see that Pelagius’ teachings were “hostile and contrary to the grace of God.” In
that letter Augustine also wrote that De Natura “tries to convince us of views that wipe out from
the hearts of the faithful a belief in the grace of God that has been given to the human race
through the one mediator between God and human beings, the man Jesus Christ.” Augustine
continues, in words that are not irrelevant to the contemporary Augustinian accounts we have
looked at:
That book of his contains and asserts many times and amply the same thing that he
also states in a certain letter sent to Your Reverence in which he says that he should
not be thought to defend free choice without the grace of God, since he says that the
ability to will and to act, without which we can neither will nor do anything good,
was implanted in us by the creator. In that way Pelagius’ teaching would have us
understand that the grace of God is something common to pagans and Christians, to
the good and the bad, and to believers and unbelievers. 11
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This teaching would “empty of meaning the Lord’s coming,” and Augustine then quotes his
version of Galatians 2:21: “If righteousness comes through nature, then Christ has died in
vain.” 12 Nature and grace are thus contrasted, showing how crucial De Natura et Gratia is in
seeking to understand what it actually was in Pelagius to which Augustine objected. The
importance of De Natura et Gratia, Augustine’s response to De Natura, is further evidenced by
its being sent by the African bishops to Rome in 416 as part of a letter to the pope, Augustine’s
sending it also to John of Jerusalem, 13 and Augustine’s own consideration of it as being of
importance to the whole debate. 14
One more word can be said on this approach. Augustine’s anti-Pelagian treatises tend to be
dealt with together, as a whole. This has merit in tracking the progress of the debate, Augustine’s
emerging thinking, and also giving attention to their polemical context. But there is also a place
for the kind of close reading that some of Augustine’s other works attract. Studies of De Natura
et Gratia only appear within broader studies of the Pelagian controversy, and no study of De
Natura et Gratia has been done in the light of recent, revisionist readings of Augustine.

The Context of De Natura et Gratia
There are interesting parallels between the context of De Natura et Gratia and our
contemporary context which has seen the issue of nature and grace rise again. While Augustine
was writing following the dawning of Constantinianism, it was also at a time when the Roman
Empire was coming to an end and when civic virtues were being eroded. Then, as now,
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Christians were trying to overcome a naturalistic, humanist autonomy that sought to define the
human without reference to God. This was not just in Stoic Rome but also in Christian North
Africa. For Augustine’s flock, Christ was often the god for the next world, but this world was
controlled by different means, including amulets, astrologers, soothsayers. 15 And they were also,
as now, dealing with a temptation to separate the domain of grace from contemporary political
concerns. Consideration of some of the major contextual influences will then be essential for
reading De Natura et Gratia and discussing its relevance for today.
The Donatist Controversy
The major controversies of Augustine’s life, against the Manichaeans, the Donatists, and
the Pelagians, followed upon each other’s heels in a relatively orderly fashion. The controversy
directly preceding the Pelagian debates was Augustine against the North African Donatists,
which occupied him during the first decade of the fifth century. While there was not a lot of
chronological overlap between the controversies, the thematic overlap is not irrelevant.
The Donatist claim, it will be remembered, was that only the pure could celebrate the
sacraments. All those Christians who had been compromised during persecutions had
immediately disqualified themselves from valid celebrations of the sacraments, even if they had
subsequently repented. The ongoing significance of the issue was ensured by the logic that all
those priests and bishops who were ordained by a compromised bishop were thus themselves
unable to validly celebrate the sacraments. Augustine, in his response to this rigor, did affirm the
Donatist claim that only the pure could celebrate the sacraments, but asserted that it was God
through Christ Jesus, who made his people pure, through the ministrations of flawed bishops.
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Christ was our mediator in this regard and not the bishops. 16 In Burns’ words, “Christ is the
guarantor of the efficacy of the sacrament.” 17 In ways that would anticipate his argument against
the Pelagians, Augustine rejected a dependence on the adequacy of human nature. Purity, merit
and validity were not generated from within but were bestowed, and continually bestowed at
that. Just because a traditor had betrayed Christ and His church, did not mean that they could not
later receive forgiveness for their sins. To suggest anything otherwise would deprive Christ of
the position as sole savior, making his blood superfluous, as Augustine would proclaim
repeatedly in the Pelagian controversy. 18
In an era of state persecution, the Donatists also stressed the complete otherness of
Christian faith. They tended to look favorably upon Orthodox Jewish relations to the Torah as a
law which set them apart from the rest of the world. In the Donatist version of the Acts of the
martyrs, for instance, one would read things like: “I care for nothing but the law of God.” 19 They
had a strong sense of ritual separation and, it is interesting to note, they cherished episcopal
succession as a visible instantiation of the Church’s purity and exclusivist community. 20 If the
church was a pure community, set apart from the world, then its members likewise had to be
pure, or else forsake the Christian community for that of the world. Augustine, by contrast, partly
under the influence of Neo-Platonic ways of thought, saw the world and the church more in a
state of becoming, in which all things depended upon God through Christ Jesus. As Peter Brown
has put it, “the rites of the church were undeniably “holy,” because of the objective holiness of a
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church which “participated” in Christ.” 21 In this way, Augustine could distinguish between the
absolute holiness of Christ, and the participatory, derived, and “becoming” holiness of the
members of the Christian church. While Burns perhaps makes Augustine sound too protoLutheran by saying that “the saints are both sinners and free of sin,” nevertheless Augustine was
under no illusion about the reality of sin in the Christian life and, in his own words, says that
Christians “are both righteous and yet not without sin.” 22 The church, then, is an ecclesia
permixta, a mixed church without full perfection, but nevertheless participating in Christ’s
holiness even while remaining sinners. In Robert Markus’ phrase, this anti-Donatist and
subsequently anti-Pelagian theology of Augustine was a sustained “defense of Christian
mediocrity,” a proclamation that the simple people of the church were still Christians. It was a
theology forged, in part, through Augustine’s pastoral experiences as bishop of Hippo. 23
Burns has also shown the relevance of Augustine’s doctrine of justification in the Donatist
controversy for his developing theology of grace. In his analysis of the development of
Augustine’s view of operative grace, Burns distinguishes between “congruous vocation”—in
which God affects his control over the human will by environmental means which work to
persuade and change—and the kind of direct, inner intervention by which God changes wills. 24
Burns’ contention is that while Augustine came to believe in “congruous vocation” earlier, with
his 396 Ad Simplicianum, the more direct functioning operative grace only appeared in
Augustine from around 418 onwards. For Burns, then, Augustine’s advocacy of coercive force at
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the end of the Donatist controversy was a significant development. His advocacy of coercion
showed that persuasion and congruous vocation was no longer all that mattered. God can
frighten in order to draw to Christ:
The justification of coercion helped move Augustine to a notion of liberty which is
the fruit of grace rather than its foundation, a freedom which is not the permanent and
inalienable possession of human nature. 25
This will become of some significance in the Pelagian controversy. Freedom is not a given part
of who we are, as Pelagius would argue, but rather the fruit of bestowed grace. The will, for
Augustine, is no longer an even scale which God directs by providing external, persuasive
weights which tend it to certain directions. Rather, it begins to look like a broken scale, tilted
away from Christ and enslaved to sin, needing not just persuasion but even violence to bring it
freedom. 26 The inner influence of direct grace would appear later, too. Thus, Burns says, “the
differences between Augustine’s early and later theories of nature and grace cannot simply be
attributed to the challenge posed by the diametrically opposed doctrines of the Manichees and
the Pelagians.” 27 The contexts did change, but so did Augustine’s understanding.
One of the ramifications of the Donatist controversy’s direct influence on Augustine’s antiPelagian theology was that those parts of the church outside North Africa who had not
experienced the Donatist controversy found it harder to understand the charges against Pelagius.
Donatism had attuned Augustine and other Africans to the dangers of Pelagianism, but it was a
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concern lost to other parts of the Christian world. As Burns writes: “The doctrine of nature and
grace developed during the Pelagian controversy was easily assimilated only by the Africans,
who shared Cyprian’s heritage and the struggle against the Donatists.” 28 There is, then, a geopolitical context that must be considered.
The Sack of Rome and the Genealogy of Controversy
On August 24, 410 Alaric the Goth entered Rome with an army. Twice in the past two
years the Goths had laid siege to Rome, crippling the city albeit without overtaking it
completely. That was achieved in August 410 when the Goths finally sacked Rome and created
innumerable Roman refugees across the empire. The Roman aristocracy had already begun
emigrating en masse from 408 onwards as Alaric began laying siege to Rome. By 410 the
emigration had exploded, and it was this direct impact which led Roman Pelagians to leave their
own shores and begin to cause controversy in North Africa. But even more significantly, Peter
Brown has suggested that the threat of the barbarian invasions may itself have helped to inspire
Pelagius and his followers’ commitment to a kind of Stoic, old way of life. 29 As he writes in his
classic biography of Augustine, “no matter how self-consciously Christian the Pelagian
movement had been, it rested firmly on a bed rock of the old ethical ideals of paganism,
especially on Stoicism.” 30
Pelagius himself was born in Britain, but then travelled in the East, only returning to the
West in order to settle in Rome around the year 400 when he would have been around fifty years
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old. Henry Chadwick suggested that his travel east formed in Pelagius a more positive approach
to nature which perhaps appealed to aristocratic Romans who were attracted to Christianity but
also feared the loss of Stoic virtues. 31 Indeed Pelagius’ first two works, De Natura and De Libero
Arbitrio were both composed in the back-and-forth of a controversy with Jerome, with whom he
may have had contact while travelling in the East, concerning the possibility of sinlessness as
well as the state of marriage. 32 Vanneste has described the former work, De Natura, as
essentially “une tentative pour christianiser l'idée grecque—et surtout stoïcienne—de nature.” 33
Pelagius would have been shocked by the apparent licentiousness of the average Roman
Christian, and instead appealed to a quasi-monastic spiritual practice which coincided with
Roman Stoicism. And so Pelagius found himself something of a spiritual advisor to Rome’s
Christian elite, and began to write commentaries on Paul’s letters from this Stoic-Christian
theological perspective. It is possible, however, to assign too much responsibility to Pelagius.
According to the contemporary Marius Mercator it was Rufinus of Syria who first sowed
“Pelagian” seed in Rome by corrupting Pelagius. Bonner writes that apart from his treatises and
some boldness,
[Pelagius] displays few positive qualities and was certainly not the leader of the
Pelagians once the battle began. His disciple, Caelestius, is a more impressive
personality, the most effective man of action which the movement produced, but we
have far too little material from his pen to evaluate him adequately. 34
This is why recent scholarship has become much warier of referring to “Pelagians,” noting that
there were a number of differing thinkers surrounding Pelagius—or whom Pelagius himself
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surrounded—who were not necessarily characterized by uniformity. In describing this circle,
Carol Harrison has written of Pelagius’ Roman milieu as being “an extremely conservative elite
of affluent, influential, lay aristocrats who self-consciously strove to set themselves apart by
enthusiastic ascetic renunciation and observance of a strict moral code.” 35 The continuity with
the Donatist tradition is not difficult to see in Harrison’s description, although we should also
add that the cohort around Pelagius were urbane. They tended to see themselves as representing
cultured, cosmopolitan scholarship in contrast to the more rustic Augustine, who continued to
use the outdated Vetus Latina instead of the fresh translations of Jerome. 36 This brought with it a
level of intellectual persuasiveness. 37 But Brown is also right to see essentially Stoic roots to this
Roman movement. The “good man” of pagan Rome had become the “good Christian,”
something Augustine would point out at the beginning of De Natura et Gratia. 38 Pelagius and his
followers saw themselves as participants in a divine economy of merit and desert, held in the
paradigms of Roman society rather than necessarily bringing fresh insights from the Scriptures. 39
Alaric and his invading Goths were Arian Christians, whose deviation from the orthodox
faith made their victory all the more painful for orthodox Christians in the empire. But the full
significance of the sacking of Rome lay in the significance of Rome for the empire. Brown

35

Harrison, Augustine, 102. Augustine’s Ep. 130 (412) to Proba, and De bono viduitatis (414) to Juliana were
both written to noble ladies affected by Pelagian ideas. And Augustine also preached against this elite approach to
the faith. In S. 169.15.18, for instance, he spoke in support of the average Christian: “Better a cripple limping along
to God, than the swiftest runner off course; yet cripple, be not proud; the runner may repent, return, and pass you on
the way.”
36

Charles T. Mathewes, “The Career of the Pelagian Controversy: Introductory Essay,” Augustinian Studies
33, no. 2 (2002): 205. Although, note that Mathewes mentions Elaine Pagels as one modern scholar who has
overdone the painting of the controversy as one between “enlightened literati” and “uptight provincial
ignoramuses.” See Elaine Pagels, Adam, Eve, and the Serpent (New York: Random House, 1988).
37

See Ep. 186.5.13.

38

Brown, Augustine, 347.

39

Mathewes, “The Career of the Pelagian Controversy,” 210.

41

writes how for pagans Rome had come to be seen as a sort of “pagan Vatican”—a fortified place
in which the old religion would survive, even if ravished in other places. Rome safeguarded the
peace of the gods for the whole empire. And this had taken on Christian significance too. The
remains of Peter and Paul in Rome had led to Christian mythic collusion with the pagan
significance of Rome. 40 And so the rise of Pelagius must also be seen in this context of
preservation of the Roman way of life, even if in a Christianized form.
Pelagius had been teaching and writing in Rome for years without attracting too much
attention. But with the sacking of Rome and the subsequent emigration, Pelagius and his
followers were forced to engage Christians beyond their own walls. One of these members of the
Pelagian circle, Caelestius, landed with Pelagius in North Africa in 411. Pelagius landed in
Hippo, but he never met Augustine, and soon travelled on to Palestine while Caelestius made his
way to Carthage. Caelestius was something of the enfant terrible of the movement and the initial
provoker of controversy. 41 He approached Aurelius, the bishop of Carthage, and asked to be
ordained. Not only did Aurelius deny his request, he accused him of heresy and condemned him,
as Caelestius refused to renounce some condemned propositions. 42 The Carthaginian jurist
Marcellinus was called upon to judge Caelestius and his teaching, and it is at this point that
Augustine was first drawn in to the controversy, albeit with Caelestius and not Pelagius. It would
take years for him to engage Pelagius directly. Marcellinus wrote to Augustine for assistance,
and Augustine responded with the first two books of De Peccatorum Meritis to which a third
book was then added. Caelestius was duly condemned in Carthage in 411 for four errors: that
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Adam had to die, that Adam’s sin injured him alone, that infants are born in a pre-lapsarian state,
and that “Adam by his death [or by his sin] does not subject the whole human race to death;
[because] Christ by His Resurrection does not give new life to the entire human race.” 43 When
Marcellinus further pressed Augustine on the issue of the necessity of grace, Augustine
responded again with De Spiritu et Littera, which is the first time that he referred to the
Pelagians as inimici gratiae Dei. 44
Pelagius himself continued to write from Palestine. In 413 he wrote a long letter to an
aristocratic Roman woman Demetrias following her decision to become a nun. This letter was “a
calculated and widely-publicized declaration of his message: “since perfection is possible for
man, it is obligatory.”” 45 His teaching did not immediately raise the ire of Eastern bishops, and it
took a Westerner to lead the charge against Pelagius in Palestine. Paul Orosius was a Spanish
priest who had been drawn to Hippo after reading Augustine. Augustine used him as a
messenger, sending him to Jerome in the summer of 415 (not yet with a copy of De Natura et
Gratia which he told Jerome was “under way” 46). Orosius arrived in Bethlehem “full of antiPelagian zeal” as Bonner puts it. 47 His enthusiasm led first to the Synod of Jerusalem and later to
a gathering of Eastern bishops at the 415 Synod of Diospolis to consider the case against
Pelagius. They forced Pelagius to retract the proposition that “on the day of judgment there will
be no mercy for the wicked and sinners, but they will be burned in everlasting fires.” 48 But
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Pelagius compromised well, distancing himself from Caelestius, and agreeing that no one had
lived a perfectly sinless life, even though maintaining it was theoretically possible by a mixture
of human labor and God’s grace. 49 While the Eastern bishops were satisfied, the Africans were
not. In 416 the African bishops sent a letter to Pope Innocent asking for Pelagius’
condemnation. 50 Despite Pelagius’ referring to God’s grace, the African bishops called him and
his followers inimici gratiae,
a charge which had a good deal of plausibility; it was very difficult to find confession
of grace in Pelagian writing in any form other than grace of creation, illumination,
and remission of sins in baptism, since their denial of any transmission of Original
Sin postulated a self-sufficiency in man's created nature. 51
While Pope Innocent agreed with the African bishops against Pelagius, his successor Zosimus,
under the influence of Caelestius, considered Pelagius' teaching to be unobjectionable. And so
the Africans appealed to the Emperor Honorius and the Imperial Court, who took charge with a
declaration from Ravenna that condemned both Pelagius and Caelestius in 417. Zosimus duly
conformed, and condemned them both in a letter that was sent throughout the East. 52 In 418 the
Council of Carthage met, attended by over 200 African bishops. They passed nine canons against
Pelagianism, including condemning even the theoretical possibility of sinlessness, something that
Augustine himself had expressed support for. 53 While the controversy continued with Julian of
Eclanum and in the so-called semi-Pelagian controversy, the condemnation of Pelagius was
complete by 418. 54
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Just how many “Pelagians” were there? Augustine seemed to suggest that they were
numerous in Africa, however the evidence is not overwhelming. 55 Gerald Bonner notes that little
is really heard of the circle around Pelagius after the condemnation of Caelestius in 411, much
less after the condemnation of both Caelestius and Pelagius in 417. While the controversy
continued throughout the 420s with Augustine and Julian of Eclanum’s fierce exchanges, there is
no evidence to suggest that “Pelagianism” was a mass movement anywhere near the size of
Arianism or Donatism. 56 When Pope Innocent I was asked in 416 whether there were any
Pelagians in Rome, he responded that he did not know. 57 In his companion essay, Bonner
suggests that Pelagianism “has been exaggerated by Church historians” in part due to its
purported theological importance. 58 He even attributes this partly to Luther, as he quotes Luther
saying that the Pelagians “made a man of Augustine” who would otherwise have been “a very
dry and thin teacher.” 59
The Writing of De Natura et Gratia
Because De Natura et Gratia was written in 415, it was traditionally assumed that De
Natura was written in the years directly preceding Augustine’s response, say around 413. Recent
scholarship has, however, argued for an earlier date, around 405–406 when Pelagius would still
have been in Rome. 60 But it would have been much closer to 415 before Augustine ever heard of
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this work. It was brought to his attention by two of Pelagius’ former pupils, Timasius and James,
who wrote to Augustine requesting his comments on De Natura which they attached to their
letter. This may have been in 413, but Serge Lancel thinks that it could have been at the end of
414. 61
In looking at the place of De Natura within the context of Pelagius’ works, Robert F. Evans
has noted that there is one significant feature of De Natura which is not present in Pelagius’
commentaries on Paul. Evans writes that Pelagius had sensed himself under pressure to
acknowledge the role of grace in the Christian life, and so attributed the capacity to avoid sin in
part to the gift of grace which was implanted in man by the Creator. 62 While the recent revision
of the date of De Natura would temper the notion that Pelagius was under any pressure at the
time of writing, it is noteworthy for our study that De Natura stands as Pelagius’ most developed
treatment of grace. 63 Evans also thinks that De Natura marks a significant turning point because
in it Pelagius employs Catholic orthodox thinkers to support his case. As we shall see, he looked
for support for his case not just in Hilary, Ambrose, Chrysostom and Jerome, but even in
Augustine himself. 64
De Natura et Gratia was probably finished in 415. When the African bishops appealed to
Pope Innocent against the exoneration of Pelagius at the Synod of Diospolis, they attached a
copy of Augustine’s treatise along with an annotated copy of De Natura. 65 Augustine himself
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also sent a copy to John of Jerusalem, who played an important role in the treatment of Pelagius
in the East. 66 We also know from one of Augustine’s letters that he considered De Natura et
Gratia to be important to the debate and worth copying. 67

De Natura et Gratia Examined
1.1–6.6 Summary of Controversy
Augustine begins with some general remarks concerning what he takes to be Pelagius’
basic approach and error. He agrees with Pelagius that men ought not to blame their sins upon
human nature. But Pelagius is “far too incensed at this evil” 68 and so, in St. Paul’s words, he
sides with those “who have zeal for God, but not in accord with knowledge. For, not knowing the
righteousness of God and wanting to establish their own, they were not subject to the
righteousness of God.” 69 Pelagius’ is an overcorrection. In desiring men to take responsibility for
their sins, he also seeks for men to take responsibility for their own righteousness rather than to
find it in adiutorio gratiae Christi. For Augustine, the law produces a fear which is only useful to
lead us, velut paedagogi, to grace. If not, then there is no need to become a Christian. Hanby has
written that here Augustine rehabilitates the law, “now elided into Christ himself and the
doxological economy manifest in him.” 70 But Augustine seems more interested in contrasting the
law with Christ, quoting—the first of many times in this treatise—Gal. 2:21: “For if
righteousness comes through the law, then Christ has died in vain.” Augustine then quotes De
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Natura at some length, where Pelagius ponders the fate of those who are yet to hear the word.
What is human nature to do but believe in the God who made heaven and earth, the
God whom it naturally perceives as its maker, and, by living correctly, fulfills his
will, though it has not received any instruction in the faith concerning the suffering
and resurrection of Christ? 71
Augustine repeats that if this were the case, Christ’s death would be in vain. If Christ’s death is
not to be in vain, human nature can only be redeemed per fidem et sacramentum sanguinis
Christi. 72 Interestingly, it is Pelagius who here stresses a natural desire for God which is even
redemptive, and Augustine who is more concerned with faith and the blood of Christ. As we
shall discuss shortly, Augustine denies that salvation can come by a kind of cosmological
participation in the Creator, even if one has led an exemplary life and never had the opportunity
to hear of Christ. 73 A few years earlier in De Spiritu et Littera he had written that it is only by the
Holy Ghost that we can love God and participate in God. 74 This is because while human nature
per se is not to be blamed for sin, that does not make it pure. 75 Augustine employs a medical
analogy by declaring that human nature sana non est and needs a medico. Importantly, human
nature continues to receive goods such as vita, sensibus, mente from God, but due to original sin,
ex originali peccato, it has a defect, vitium, and is sick. 76 Our natures are deserving of a
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punishment which is completely just. Grace, then, is not merited, sed gratis datur, and those who
do not receive grace receive a punishment that is fully deserved because they are not free from
sin. God’s justice would thus be blameless even if he condemned everyone. 77 Pelagius’ contrary
position may “have the semblance of cleverness” but it is a “wordy wisdom that does away with
the cross of Christ” and denies the scriptures. 78 As Hanby has identified, there is a Stoicism in the
Pelagian position which ultimately points to a nihilistic definition of man without reference to
God. Augustine refers to this as a mistaken, Pelagian notion that we are “self-sufficient for
righteousness.” 79
7.7–18.20 Sinlessness and Grace
Having spoken broadly of what is at stake, Augustine then begins to work through De
Natura in a more systematic fashion. He introduces the possibility of sinlessness in this life, a
point which Pelagius and Augustine shared agreement on. Augustine, expanding upon Pelagius,
distinguishes between what the Lord is able to do, and what he wills to do—something of an
anticipation of the medieval distinction between potentia absoluta and potentia ordinata. As we
have noted, Augustine was open to the theoretical possibility of sinlessness in this life, until the
418 Council of Carthage declared this position anathema. 80 His openness was a result of his
emphasis on the power of God’s grace, which could be employed according to whatever his
sovereignty and freedom willed. 81 Brown writes of a spirit in Augustine’s writings according to
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which most things were possible by God’s grace. In contrast to some of the more memorable
passages in the Confessions, Augustine never dramatized “the combat of chastity.” 82 But in
harmony with the first half of his celebrated prayer from the Confessions, he had full confidence
that God could give what he commanded.
But Augustine detects in Pelagius a different spirit. To illustrate this, Augustine raises
Pelagius’ position that Adam’s sin is not contracted through birth, but rather propter imitationem
of Adam’s sin. For Pelagius, an original sin that is infectious by birth could not bring any guilt
upon men because they did not have the possibility of being anything else. While Augustine was
willing, at this stage, to allow for the possibility of God’s grace to so overwhelm a person that
they lived without sin, Pelagius did not so stress the grace of God, causing Augustine to suspect
that he located this possibility in the ability of human nature, thus doing away with the cross of
Christ. 83 Augustine then quotes from De Natura, where Pelagius expresses a certain agnosticism
concerning the means by which the possibility of sinlessness may be brought about: “Whether it
is by grace or by a help or by mercy or whatever it is by which a human being can be without
sin, whoever admits the reality also admits the means to it as well.” 84 Augustine writes that upon
reading this he was “suddenly flooded with joy” because it appeared that Pelagius was not
denying the importance of the grace of God. But as he read on, he began to have “suspicions,”
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because all of the analogies that Pelagius used concerned the power of nature such as a man
arguing, a bird flying, and a rabbit running.
He seems, in any case, to have mentioned things that nature can do, for these
members, namely, the tongue, wings, and feet, were created for natures of this sort.
He has not said the sort of things that we want to be understood in the case of the
grace without which a human being cannot be justified, where there is a question of
healing, not of creating natures. Already uneasy for this reason, I began to read the
rest, and I found that my suspicions were not mistaken. 85
For Augustine, sinlessness, and thus freedom, is not something inherently a part of human nature
but is rather the goal of the process of Christ’s gracious healing. 86 That which Pelagius assumed a
human being had from the start on account of his nature, Augustine proclaimed Christ was
bringing about within us as we make progress by his grace. 87
It is important to note here that Pelagius did not deny the reality of grace, and seemed tired
of people assuming he did. 88 Augustine seems to be aware of this, and refrains from calling
Pelagius inimicus gratiae even though he previously had, albeit without naming him, in De
Spiritu et Littera. 89 But what did he mean by grace? As his anthropological and zoological
analogies show, Pelagius did not always stress a meaningful distinction between nature and
grace. Both are at work in leading men and creatures to their natural ends. 90 He does not always
explicitly mention grace, because he does not consider it to be entirely separate from nature,
even while he does not deny its reality. Thus Augustine and Pelagius agree that human efforts to
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avoid sin remain futile without the support of divine grace, but they both mean different things
by grace. Wegener, Lamberigts, and Lambert have recently written, in their summary of De
Natura et Gratia:
Augustine acknowledges that Pelagius does not deny the human dependence on
divine grace. But he severely criticizes his opponent for equating grace with the
natural capacities of human nature instead of recognizing its character as an
undeserved gift granted by God. 91
But that is perhaps not as clear as it could be. Something can be both a part of the natural
capacities of human nature as well as an undeserved gift granted by God. Indeed, Pelagius could
affirm both with respect to grace. And, it is important to note, he did not completely elide grace
into nature. Even though Jerome could condemn Pelagian “grace” as being no more than free
will with God’s law as a guide, 92 Pelagius does also speak of grace as the forgiveness which
comes through Jesus Christ, especially in baptism. 93 Indeed for Pelagius, baptismal grace seemed
to bring a dramatic fresh start in contrast to Augustine’s insistence that the old man still
endured. 94 But this is a key to seeing their differences. For Augustine, grace was something to be
continually received as the Christian lived their life in participation with Christ, something we
shall explore further. In the faith which apprehends grace, “wrong actions are both forgiven and,
by the help of grace, avoided.” 95 Pelagius’ theology of grace was much more indebted to the
Stoical vision whereby we operate in something of a closed circle, with baptism being a
somewhat uncharacteristic intrusion of forgiveness, and the avoidance of sin being our
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responsibility. Augustine acknowledges that Pelagius does not deny that we should ask for
pardon, but he does note that Pelagius never counsels that one should pray for help so as not to
sin. 96 While we here need to note that John Milbank especially does share with Pelagius an
approach to nature and grace marked by elision, Radical Orthodoxy seeks to elevate nature as
God’s underserved and gracious gift in which we are continually participating, whereas Pelagius
sought to domesticate grace as a deposit given to an autonomous humanity. In Eugene Portalié’s
words: “The foundation of the Pelagian system, then, is the absolute independence of human
liberty in relationship to God and its unlimited power for good as well as for evil,” something
which has its origins in Stoicism. He goes on:
According to Pelagius, man owes existence and freedom of choice (which he calls the
possibility of good) to God the Creator. This is the only gift of God and, since it is
gratuitous, Pelagius calls it a grace, playing on the words. Any further influence of
God on freedom of choice would destroy it. 97
The fulfilment of this vision could be seen in Julian of Eclanum who proclaimed: “The freedom
of the will is that by which man is freed from God,” something which von Harnack rightly said
was essentially atheistic in structure as God becomes a spectator and not a participant. 98
Augustine invokes this participatory nature of grace by raising the topic of prayer. That the
church prays with the Psalmist, “Guide my journeys according to your word, and let not
sinfulness dominate me,” means that the Lord does not leave us up to our own resources and that
his grace does in part help us avoid sin. 99 Responding to Pelagius’ discussion of the book of
James, Augustine writes that James is actually showing that left to ourselves, we have no hope
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against sin. James teaches that “the human tongue is so great an evil that it cannot be tamed by
any human being, though even wild animals are tamed by humans.” The goal is not despair or
resignation, but that “we would beg the help of divine grace.” 100 Augustine had raised this at the
beginning of his treatise, namely that the law leads us to cling to God’s grace for help. Pelagian
self-sufficiency, in which the law provides us with information regarding the proper conduct of
our lives, leaves no room for prayer. As Augustine asks, “is someone going to oppose this prayer
in order to avoid harm to free choice, because it is sufficient unto itself by its natural ability to
observe all the commandments pertaining to righteousness?” 101
We can here see the validity of the Radical Orthodoxy concern that modernity has fostered
a kind of Pelagian delusion of self-sufficiency. Augustine is well aware of the ramifications of
Pelagian grace cutting off God and man from continual relationship with each other. This
represents something of a development in Augustine. Burns notes that the newly converted
Augustine believed in a certain amount of autonomy. His asceticism was of a piece with a kind
of spiritual autonomy, free from bodily concerns, whereby he had the freedom to orient his mind
towards darkness or light. Burns cites from the Cassiciacum dialogues in which Augustine had
written things like: “The soul relies on its own natural resources and that assistance which God
provides through human society,” and then also, “The work of divine Wisdom and Love neither
supplement nor substitute for human action.” 102 But Burns helpfully shows how the early
Manichaean debates had made him circumspect about human freedom and self-sufficiency. The
Manichaeans dwelt in a universe which was too voluntarist. And so, Burns writes, Augustine’s
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“prior assertions of human autonomy were muted. The discussion of conversion shifted from the
human quest for God to the divine approach to humanity in Christ.” 103 Burns later adds, “The
spiritual universalism of his Italian dialogues was finally shattered on the rock of Paul’s
epistles.” 104 But even in the Confessions, Burns argues, Augustine presents God’s operative grace
as controlling decisions through external influences, what Burns calls “congruous vocation,”
while keeping the essential freedom of the human spirit inviolate. 105 There here comes a point at
which Burns comes close to overstating his case regarding the Confessions, given that Augustine
there acknowledges that God “is more inward than my most inward part”, or “closer to me than
myself” (interior intimo meo), showing that Augustine’s anthropology is already explicitly antiautonomous. 106
By the time of De Natura et Gratia, however, Augustine had moved fully towards a
conception of ongoing dependence on God for all things. One of the verses he cites the most
during the Pelagian controversy is 1 Cor. 4:7: “For who has set you apart? But what do you have
that you have not received?” 107 De Lubac, and Radical Orthodoxy following him, are on
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Augustinian ground when they stress the giftedness of all of life against a modernist, Pelagian,
self-sufficiency from God. In Rowan Williams’ approximation of Augustine’s thought: “I do not
know myself; but God knows me. God’s knowledge of me is available not as a picture I can
grasp or as a piece of information, but in the form of trust in God’s love—faith, in other words.
Such trust is grounded in and enabled by the history of Christ.” 108
19.21–32.36 Original Sin and Participation
Augustine then introduces Pelagius’ counter-argument. Sin is either a substance, or it is
something without any substance which only refers to an act of wrongdoing. Rejecting the
former, Pelagius concludes that something which lacks substance cannot weaken or change
human nature. Thus our nature remains free from injury. 109 Augustine responds again with his
appeal to Scripture and prayer, bringing Pelagius’ argument into debate with the Scripture.
Would it be wrong, Augustine asks, to pray with the Psalmist “heal my soul, for I have sinned
against you,” or to agree with the Lord that “it is not those who are in good health who need a
physician, but those who are sick”? Taking up again this medical analogy, Augustine probes
further: “What is there to heal, if nothing is wounded, nothing injured, nothing weakened and
harmed?” 110 This rhetorical pattern is common for Augustine, to first attend to the text of
Scripture, and then to address the logic of the argument. Yes, he says, Pelagius is right to see that
sin is not a substance. But, to take the case of food, not eating is also not a substance and yet if
someone abstains from food, “the substance of the body wastes away” and it even begins to
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reject food. Augustine then applies the analogy in an interesting way.
So too, sin is not a substance, but God is a substance and the highest substance and
the only true food of a rational creature. Listen to what the creature says, because it
has withdrawn from this food by disobedience and is unable to take, by reason of
weakness, what it ought to have enjoyed, My heart has been beaten and dried out like
hay, because I have forgotten to eat my bread (Ps. 102:5). 111
The food the rational creature needs is God. By rejecting this “substance,” man not only is in
need of forgiveness, but also in need of healing, because he has lost his appetite for God, for the
very thing that he needs. This “lack” of God is not a substance, and yet it damages the substance
of man and distorts it. Augustine goes on to quote from Romans, according to which God
punished some by handing
them over to the desires of their heart, to impurity ... For their women exchanged
natural intercourse for that which is against nature. Likewise, the men too abandoned
natural relations with women and burned with desire for one another, men
committing perversities upon men. They received in themselves the mutual
recompense of their error, as they deserved (Rom. 1:24–27).
For Augustine then, sin, which is a lack of the substance of God, has led to a damaged nature,
wrongly oriented and with diminished strength. If we continue without the substance of God, if
God leaves us to the desires of our heart, we will not be left to what is natural, or even to a
neutral decision, but rather to what is unnatural. Moreover, we bear the culpability for this
damaged tendency towards the unnatural, for the recompense of error is deserved. The
punishment of sin is thus not only external, but intrinsic to the damage which sin does to us. 112
This definition of sin thus continues Augustine’s stress on the need for ongoing
participation in God. Sin has left us as discordant creatures who need concord. 113 We have
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already mentioned John Cavadini’s article, “The Darkest Enigma,” in which he sees that there
exists no such thing as a stable, independent “self” for Augustine. 114 If anything, we can see here
that that is a more Pelagian position, whereby nature cannot be touched by sin because it is
lacking substance. The lack of God for Augustine, however, has damaged us. Fleshing out his
analogy of hunger, he writes:
If one completely abstains from food, the substance of the body wastes away; it is
destroyed by an imbalance in health, is drained of strength, and is weakened and
broken by exhaustion to the point that, even if one somehow continues to live, he can
scarcely be enticed back to food, though by abstaining from it his health was
injured. 115
This is a condition that needs external help, so distorted have we become due to the rejection of
God. Pelagius, Augustine writes, thinks that because it was our wills which led us to
wrongdoing, it is our wills that now can set us on the right path. As if the remedy for a bad
choice is a good choice. But sin has led to the death of the soul, which can only lead to more sin,
and it “necessarily produces dead works until the grace of Christ brings it back to life.” 116 We can
even see in Augustine that our participation in God is not simply despite our sin, but, in a
mysterious way, through our sin and suffering. Radical Orthodoxy stresses our continual
participation in God as the source of all being in whom we continually receive our being. But
Augustine also sees our need for God not just in terms of existence, but in terms of healing from
sin. Peter Burnell has said that for Augustine our participation with God almost depends on sin to
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counter our natural pride and make us aware of our dependence on God. 117 Without fully
understanding the woundedness of our nature, we are prone to an imagined self-sufficiency,
which brings a theodical aspect to Augustine’s thought. Burns puts it this way:
Augustine explained that God allows Christians to continue experiencing their
weakness and dependence on the divine assistance in order to prevent a resurgence of
the pride and self-reliance which caused the original fall of humanity. A lesser grace
is given so that a greater sin may be forestalled. 118
We are participatory according to our status as created beings, but Augustine’s stress in De
Natura et Gratia is our need also for God according to that part of us which is wounded by sin.
That our being comes from God is undeniable, but as we have seen, Augustine is keen to show
up the great distinction between Christians and good pagans. 119 For example, in one of his
sermons, Augustine says: “Even if I do not consent to it, there is still in me both something dead
and something alive. Surely you cannot deny that this dead part of you belongs to you?” 120 That
which is alive corresponds to all human beings, but Augustine the bishop stresses a participation
that restores that which is dead. And so in De Natura et Gratia, he continues by showing that
there are evils which, by the mercy of God, lead to good. Again, Augustine does this by
appealing to Scripture and prayer:
Did the psalmist suffer something good when he said, You turned your face away
from me, and I became confused (Ps 30:8)? Certainly not! And yet this confusion was
in some sense a remedy against his pride. He had, after all, said in his prosperity, I
will never be shaken (Ps 30:7) and attributed to himself what he had from the Lord.
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For what did he have that he had not received? Hence, he had to be shown the source
of what he had so that he might receive in humility what he had lost though pride. 121
Augustine rejects the position that God gives evil that grace may abound. But he also recognizes
that we come to the humility which acknowledges our true dependence on God through sin and
suffering. A little further on, Augustine writes of God’s redemptive use of suffering:
[God] certainly acts with the aim of healing everything, but he acts according to his
own judgment and does not take from the sick person the prescription for the cure. He
undoubtedly wanted to make that man the strongest of apostles to whom he said,
Virtue is made perfect in weakness (2 Cor 12:9), and despite his frequent prayers, he
did not remove from him the thorn in the flesh. 122
Simply acknowledging our dependence on God for our being is not enough, for even the pagans
can do that. There is also then a kind of participation in God which is not with respect to being,
but has to do with our weakness and need for redemption through Christ. As he says later on in
this treatise, every day we pray that our Father would forgive us our sins, as we forgive others.
And by means of our supplications, “pardon immediately wipes away the sins we repeatedly
commit out of ignorance or weakness.” 123 But it is through our sins that are we are led to daily
repentance and humility before God. As Augustine put it in one of his sermons: “When I say to
you that without the help of God you do nothing, I mean nothing good, for you have the freedom
of choice to act evilly without the help of God.” 124 Augustine would not dispute that even acting
evilly entails the “help” of God with respect to existence. But beyond being, we can be cut off
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from participation in God. Augustine is here wishing clearly to distinguish between doing
nothing with respect to being, and doing nothing with respect to what pleases God, between an
order of creation and an order of redemption. This is crucial to understanding how Augustine
conceives of participation, and it is a distinction that is not always evident in Radical Orthodoxy.
In a more recent, parallel, example, W. Bachmann criticized Emil Brunner for ignoring “the
communion with the Creator which has already been given to the sinner.” Brunner's Augustinian
response in instructive: “But how can man be seen as sinner if he is not created by God!
Communion with the Creator has been forfeited by sin. It has become life ‘under the wrath of
God.’ ” 125 For Brunner, everyone exists only in relation to God, but that relation, or even
participation, can be negative or positive. “Indeed, sin itself is a relation to God: that of rebellion
against the Creator, unbelief, ingratitude, apostasy.” 126
As Augustine moves in this direction in De Natura et Gratia, the medical analogies which
he has predominantly employed begin to be stretched, for sin’s sickness extends to deceiving
ourselves that “I will never be shaken.” In paraphrasing Romans 7:23 Augustine mentions that
the law of sin leads to our members actually resisting, repugnat, the law of the mind. 127 When
Augustine then returns to the medical analogy, the patient never asks to be healed, but rather it is
the Physician who is always the actor. 128 These concerns lead Augustine to then take up Pelagius’
claim that all sins are sins of pride. Pelagius is led to this claim because he assumes that the will
is a neutral actor, and that man can either decide to do what accords with God’s law, or what he
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himself would prefer to do. Every sin is, in a sense, explicitly and consciously directed against
God. 129 Augustine, of all people, cannot disagree that pride is an inescapable scourge which
afflicts us all. 130 Yet he ultimately refutes Pelagius’ claim that all sin is pride in an effort to show
that we are not equally predisposed to God and sin, but that we are oriented towards sin and to
the deception that we are well. Because we are damaged by sin, we “are in poor shape and
commit many sins either out of weakness or out of blindness,” 131 “and often by persons weeping
and groaning.” 132 Augustine is led to this by his theological anthropology, but there is also here
something of Augustine’s “defense of Christian mediocrity.” 133 Interestingly, though, Augustine
also wants to qualify this orientation towards sin. Following a catalogue of biblical supplications
for mercy, salvation, truth, and support, he writes:
[W]e do not take away the choice of the will, but we proclaim the grace of God. Who
benefits from all these things, unless they are willing? But they must be willing with
humility and not raise themselves up with pride over the powers of the will, as if it
alone were sufficient for the perfection of righteousness. 134
This stands in contrast with the early Luther of the “Heidelberg Disputations” for whom desire is
not merely in need of re-orienting but destruction. “The remedy for curing desire does not lie in
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satisfying it, but in extinguishing it. In other words, he who wishes to become wise does not seek
wisdom by progressing toward it but becomes a fool by retrogressing into seeking folly.” 135
Indeed in his “Preface to the Latin Writings” Luther called the failure to see that the law kills
sinners and establishes something new altogether, the “Augustinian imperfection.” 136 As Brown
puts it, “The wisdom of God, for the old Augustine, bruised human reason.” 137 But it never
obliterated it. Michael Hanby has been right to emphasize that Augustine did not treat nature and
grace, or human desire and grace, as a simple zero-sum game. 138 When he looked back on De
Natura et Gratia in his writing of the Retractiones, he described it as a work in which he “did not
defend grace in opposition to nature, but the grace by which nature is set free and ruled.” 139
33.37–60.70 Faith and the Particularity of Grace
Returning to the topic of sinlessness, Augustine agrees with Pelagius that sinlessness is not
the same as being “on a par with God.” Augustine takes the opportunity to affirm the distinction
between the creature and the Creator, adding that he is “not convinced” that we will be “changed
into the divine substance and become exactly what he is.” 140 Just as Augustine wants to hold up
this distinction, so too he moves on to the distinction between the orders of creation and
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redemption. Pelagius, Augustine writes, “thinks that he is pleading God’s case in defending
nature.” But “in declaring this same nature healthy, he rejects the mercy of the physician…
Hence, we should not praise the creator so that we are forced to say, indeed so that we are found
guilty of saying, that the savior is unnecessary (superfluum).” 141 Thus the righteous people of the
Scriptures were not without sin. When we praise them, we ought not to imagine that their natures
were perfect, or that they did not daily repent of their sins. Augustine notably says of Mary that
“on account of the honor due to the Lord,” he does not want to discuss whether or not her nature
was without sin. 142 But his main point here is to stress that righteousness does not mean free from
sin, with an uncorrupted nature, but rather the opposite. It is the righteous who speak the truth
about themselves, and who “wage a daily and constant battle” 143 against sinful desire, and so are
forgiven their sins and granted freedom in Christ. As Burns puts it, “freedom in good is the
consequence of the presence of God’s Spirit, not a natural property of any created being;
servitude in evil follows inevitably from the exercise of free choice in the absence of grace.” 144
For Pelagius, sinlessness was possible not because of the power of intervening grace, but
because of the strength of nature. The will, for Pelagius, was a neutral power, capable through its
natural ability of choosing the right way to live, even if Christ had assisted in teaching it the right
path. But if this is the case, Augustine repeats, then Christ has died in vain. If Christ was just a
teacher, then his death was meaningless. But if indeed our righteousness was not capable of
effecting salvation, then Christ’s death becomes intelligible as saving our “corrupt human
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nature.” 145 Sinlessness, for Augustine, was a possibility only by the grace of God, and not
according to our nature. 146 Augustine is here revealing a chasm that we have already seen
between his and Pelagius’ thought—namely, whether salvation was an internal or an external
power. Against Pelagius’ assertion of human autonomy and the will’s inalienable capacity to do
good or evil, Augustine did not stress a sheer passivity that denied the will any role. But he did
stress its dependence on external things, and the way in which human activity was limited. The
internal power of sight is useless, for example, without the external provision of light. We may
have the natural capacity to hear, and yet we hear many things “against our will.” 147 Extending
this reality, Augustine argues that love and concupiscence likewise come from outside of our
will, from the Holy Spirit and Adam respectively. As Burns puts it, “In their origin each lies
beyond human control. In their functioning, each effectively directs human operation. The
Pelagians rejected his analysis of both.” 148 This Augustinian relationship between receptivity
complementing internal appropriation can be seen in the Formula of Concord. The confessors
there state that Luther’s understanding that the will behaves “altogether passively” refers to the
initial movement whereby the Holy Spirit converts us.
But after the Holy Spirit has performed and accomplished this and the will of man
has been changed and renewed solely by God’s power and activity, man’s new will
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becomes an instrument and means of God the Holy Spirit, so that man not only lays
hold on grace but also cooperates with the Holy Spirit in the works that follow. 149
This summary is helpful in understanding how it is that Augustine can later say in De Natura et
Gratia that our hearts are being made pure “by our efforts, labor, prayers, and pleas that by his
grace we are being brought through Jesus Christ, our Lord, to that perfection in which we can see
God with a pure heart.” 150 The work of grace in us heals our broken wills so that we might be
engaged in ongoing participation in God’s grace. God’s grace thus comes from outside of us,
extra nos, and is solely active in the initial movement, and yet it also takes hold of something
real within us. Because the will is not neutrally disposed towards God, on the one hand, and evil,
on the other, as Pelagius would have it, it needs to be prepared by God and engaged by God—
“grace heals the will by which we freely love righteousness.” 151 In a later work, Augustine would
say that no one believes in God unwillingly, but this is not the result of the natural powers of the
will, but rather because the unwilling are made willing by God. 152 Thus for Augustine it is not
that we necessarily lack the power to resist sin, but rather the will. And so God’s salvific,
external grace, does not destroy us, but changes us, “because God does not produce our salvation
in us as if we were mindless rocks or beings in whose nature he did not create reason and
will.” 153 God’s grace is not extraneous to his created beings. As St. Paul wrote in words which
Augustine quotes in De Spiritu et Littera, “For it is God who produces in you both the willing
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and the action in accord with good will.” 154
To put it another way as Augustine once did in a sermon, and to highlight an important
distinction for our discussion of Radical Orthodoxy: qui creavit te sine te, non salvabit te sine
te. 155 God’s act of creation and his act of saving are different realities, even if they are both gifts
of the one God. Milbank and Hanby are right to stress the latter, but they are wrong to ignore, or
at least sideline, the former distinction. This is a theme which Augustine now addresses in De
Natura et Gratia. Pelagius does not plead God’s cause when he defends nature. Rather God is
served “better when one acknowledges both the creator and the savior than when one destroys
the help of the savior by defending the creature, as if it were healthy and at full strength.” 156
Hanby, in an effort to highlight the giftedness of all creation, has referred to “Augustine's elision
of creation and sanctification into a single economy.” 157 There is of course, a continuity between
these orders. Hanby expresses this by approvingly quoting Gerhart Ladner who said that for
Augustine “only the saint truly is.” That is, creation already anticipates and finds its fulfilment in
redemption. The saint “can become herself by becoming God’s.” 158 And yet Hanby does not do
justice to the importance Augustine stresses on distinguishing between creation and redemption,
a distinction made stark by original sin, even if our substance is not identified with sin. Jaroslav
Pelikan has correctly written that for Augustine, “creation was an act of sheer grace,” 159 but that
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is not necessarily the same as saying that nature and grace are a part of a single economy. In the
context of the anti-Pelagian controversy, Augustine is more reluctant to speak about creation as a
grace, even while fully acknowledging its being a gift of God. 160 Thus he continues by saying
that human nature needs grace “not that it may be created, but that it may be restored.” 161 As he
had clearly stated in De Trinitate, “What we have received in order to be is one thing, what we
received in order to be holy is another.” 162 The first does not involve us, but the latter does,
through faith. Indeed it is Radical Orthodoxy’s lack of any meaningful discussion of faith which
reveals its lack of a meaningful distinction between creation and redemption. As Augustine goes
on to say, it is faith which heals us, “faith in the mediator between God and human beings, the
man Jesus Christ, faith in his blood, faith in his cross, faith in his death and resurrection.” 163
Hanby, by contrast, claims that for Augustine distinctions between nature and grace, or creation
and redemption, are ultimately mistaken.
First, the understanding of these distinctions as marking different “moments” in the
divine life is ruled out by God’s immutability, and is rather made intelligible by the
fact that the activity of the effect qua effect is displayed precisely in its activity.
Second, the differences in kind are rendered suspect by the ultimate convertability of
esse and beatus within the magis and minus esse distinction. The recognition of some
sort of specific distinction between the discrete “acts” of creation and sanctification,
or between nature and grace, is only possible from the vantage afforded by a
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perspective which privileges a bare and naked esse, or a Cartesian infinite, over the
categories of good, beautiful and true. 164
Augustine is happy to attribute virtues even among non-Christians as being “the gift of God.” 165
So Hanby is right to see that Augustine opposes any sense of human autonomy, divorced from
God, even among non-Christians. 166 But faith nevertheless brings about a gift which is different
from the gift of being and the gifts of character to pagans. It is a gift with which we are fully
involved in so far as we already exist. And so Augustine’s interest is in the grace that restores,
not the grace that creates or gives virtue to the faithless. 167 Portalié writes:
Augustine distinguished quite explicitly the two orders of grace: the grace of the
natural virtues (a simple gift of internal providence which prepares efficacious
motives for the will) and the grace for salutary and supernatural acts which is given
with the first preludes of faith. The latter is the grace of children (gratia filiorum); the
former is the grace for all—even strangers (filii concubinarum), Augustine adds, can
receive it. Speaking of death courageously suffered by a heretic, he says that it is a
gift of God, but far different from the gifts reserved for Christians: “As one cannot
deny that this is a gift of God, so one must understand that there are other gifts of
God for the children of that free Jerusalem which is above, our mother.” 168
The role of faith, for Augustine, thus demarcates the line between God’s different gifts of
creation and redemption. While Paul says that “the righteousness of one led to the justification of
life for all human beings,” Augustine nevertheless stresses that this does not mean that “all [do]
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believe in him” but just that no one can be justified “without believing in him.” 169 Just as there is
a distinction between creation and redemption, so too there is a difference between the ways in
which we participate in these different orders. Radical Orthodoxy, and others, have been correct
to show that receptivity is a part of human existence and that all beings are continually dependent
upon God, who is Being, for their existence. But this participation is not faith, which is
something not all are given. Augustine is thus keen to uphold a relationship between grace and
faith which Radical Orthodoxy fails to notice. For Augustine, the exclusivity of this divine gift
serves to distinguish grace from nature. In a later anti-Pelagian treatise, De Gratia et Libero
Arbitrio, Augustine blames the Pelagians for daring to say “that grace is the nature by which we
were created” rather than “the grace which comes through faith in Jesus Christ. For it is certain
that we have this nature in common even with sinners and non-believers, but the grace through
faith in Jesus Christ belongs only to those who have this faith. For not all have faith.” 170 In the
treatise under our consideration, Augustine likewise identifies within Pelagianism a tendency to
elide nature and grace. Pelagius attempts to refute accusations that he ignores grace by saying
that “whatever lies in the necessity of nature undoubtedly pertains to the author of nature,
namely, God,” and so thus cannot exist apart from “grace.” 171
We shall consider in the next chapter to what degree this is similar to Hanby’s and Radical
Orthodoxy’s referring to “Augustine's elision of creation and sanctification into a single
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economy.” 172 But for our present purposes, it must be said that one of Augustine’s issues with
this is that nature does not discriminate, whereas salvific grace does. Pelagius’ theology thus
begins to look like an attempt to reconcile God’s love with the scandal of particularity, resolving
the question by rationalizing the distribution of grace to all people via their created nature.
Pelagius had famously objected to Augustine’s prayer in the Confessions: “Give what you
command, and command what you will.” Brown writes that this was because “it seemed to blur,
by personal acts of favouritism, the incorruptible majesty of God the Lawgiver.” 173 Augustine
recognizes this, and challenges Pelagius to reconcile such universality with the validity of
baptism. If human nature is so graced unto salvation, “Are those who are not yet baptized not
included in human nature?”174 Of course they are, but Pelagius is reluctant to say that they lack
grace or ability. For all of Augustine’s theology of participation, he definitely considers nonChristians to be living without grace. Portalié is right to say that it is at least semi-Pelagian to say
that all men receive “an equal measure of graces.” 175 Augustine affirmed this in one of his letters:
“We know it is not given to all men... We know that those who do not receive grace are passed
over by a just judgment of God.” 176
As Augustine had stressed earlier, the righteous ones are not without sin, but are those who
rather confess that to say they were without sin would be a lie. Baptism, Augustine now goes on
to say, does not remove from us the opposition of the flesh, but it does bring the Holy Spirit’s
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forgiveness and the ongoing strength to resist sin. 177 The very existence of baptism challenges
optimistic views of creation and reveals that indeed our natures are not healthy and that we are in
need of a grace which is different from that of creation. Brown can thus state that “The nature of
baptism provided the great watershed separating the two men.” 178 Augustine continues:
If we get these people to grant that those who have not yet been baptized should
implore the help of the grace of the savior, this is no small victory against that false
defense of nature and the power of free choice, on the grounds that they are selfsufficient (sibi sufficientis). After all, he was not self-sufficient who said, Wretched
man that I am! Who will set me free from the body of this death? Or are we to say that
one has full freedom while still begging to be set free? 179
Augustine thus brings God’s grace to the concrete reality of baptism in the name of God and the
reception of the Holy Spirit. It is the reception of the Holy Spirit which brings a person not to
fear, but to love God and his commands. 180 Burns is correct to point out that we can see here
Augustine moving away from a generic natural desire for God. That would have supported the
Pelagian cause by suggesting that within our nature there was an attraction to the goodness of
God. There is also then a Pelagian danger in Milbank’s assertion that nature has an intrinsic
desire for grace which is not only experienced as a lack, but even as an anticipation of grace.
Lest Christ’s death be in vain, grace must always be unexpected and disorienting. Outside of the
Pelagian controversy, Augustine did understand humanity to be created in the imago and ordered
towards the similitudo of God. 181 But that must be squared with Augustine’s insistence here that
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it was the Holy Spirit that moved a person to love God. 182 And only this working of the Holy
Spirit created within the baptized Christian what Burns has called “an orientation to personal
beatitude.” 183 This points to another reality at play in this debate.
The Pelagian position, while emphasizing personal responsibility for salvation, emphasized
a cosmological view of God and was less enamored with a view of God that dealt discriminately
and directly in personal particularities. In all debates about nature and grace, there is a tendency
to abstraction, whereby grace becomes a metaphysical category rather than a gift of the Holy
Spirit. Throughout De Natura et Gratia and indeed the entire Pelagian controversy, Augustine
shows his concern not so much with the ubiquitous, cosmological grace of creation, but with the
soteriological and particular grace of personal redemption through faith in the incarnate,
crucified and resurrected Christ. 184 Burns has rightly drawn attention to this aspect of the
controversy, and sees that in Augustine continually referring matters back to the crucified Christ,
he is warning against cosmology replacing a soteriology mediated through Christ. 185 This is
important, because the Augustinianism of Hanby draws in large measure from De Trinitate,
which is concerned with ontological and metaphysical realities, and tends to read the Pelagian
controversy through this lens. Hanby has written that Augustine's cosmology is “an aesthetic
soteriology” 186 and considers Augustine’s victory over Pelagius not as a triumph of grace over
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nature, but rather, as we have already had occasion to note, as a
cosmological triumph. Implicitly it vindicated and instituted nature as the gratuitous
creation of the transcendent God against the machinations of the pyr teknikon, the
self-crafting fire of stoicism, for which any interaction between human and divine
must be a “tensional” interchange between immanent forces. 187
As we have seen in this treatise, however, Pelagius was all too willing to see nature as the
gratuitous creation of the transcendent God. But more to the point, Augustine moved throughout
his career from a concern with cosmology towards soteriology. 188 For example, in one of the
recently re-discovered Dolbeau sermons, most likely delivered in 408 or 409, Augustine
acknowledged “the obvious signs of order to be perceived in heaven and earth” which attest to
God’s care for human beings. But this was an argument that the pagans largely shared in too. For
the Christian, “the surest possible indication” of God’s care was not the order of the cosmos but
the incarnation, death and resurrection of the Lord Jesus Christ. “It is not only, therefore, the fact
that God has a care for human affairs, but how much he cares, which we are given the surest
possible proof of by the manifest reality of Christ's birth, by the patient endurance of his death,
by the power of his resurrection.” The creation and direction of the cosmos only reveals God’s
providence, whereas it is in the God-man Jesus Christ that the love of God is revealed. 189 The
order of creation was evidence of the Creator, but it was the humiliation of Christ which revealed
the more important reality of God’s love for humankind. As Peter Brown has put it, “the cosmos
was largely stripped of religious meaning for Augustine because the centre of gravity of his
thought had shifted elsewhere. He was concerned with a more urgent matter—how might God
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reach out to save humankind.” 190 And as we have seen Augustine argue in De Natura et Gratia,
there is no salvation by belief in the creator, even if one has had no opportunity to hear of
Christ. 191 Brown elaborates on this Augustinian perspective:
Augustine would never look up at the stars and gaze at the world around him with the
shudder of religious awe that fell upon Plotinus, when he exclaimed “pas de ho
khôros hieros”: “All the place is holy.”... Augustine pointedly refused to share in this
enthusiasm. He viewed the Platonic notion of a World Soul, a majestic anima mundi
that gave life and vividness to the entire realm of nature, as an uninteresting and
basically unnecessary speculation: if such an entity existed at all, all that mattered
was that it should not be worshipped instead of God. That was all that needed to be
said on the matter. 192
This is not to say, as we have already noted, that Augustine was a proto-Cartesian. Man is not
isolated or autonomous for Augustine. His is not so much an inward turn as a soteriological,
personal turn from a kind of Plotinian cosmological theology. But it is a turn nevertheless, and
one that does not shy away from the scandal of the particularity of God’s grace in Christ Jesus.
61.71–68.82 Catalogue of Testimonies
In the final section of this treatise, Augustine runs through some of the arguments that
Pelagius had drawn in his own support from other Christian writers. As we have noted earlier,
Evans thinks that this marks a turning point in the debate because Pelagius is no longer keeping
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to himself but drawing some pillars of the faith into his theology, including Augustine. 193
Nevertheless Augustine seems to be disparaging of the importance of this when he notes that
Pelagius is looking for support “not from the canonical scriptures but from some writings of
Catholic commentators.” 194 Augustine comes to the defense of the orthodox writers Pelagius had
employed, and takes the opportunity to reiterate some of the key points of the treatise, while also
taking some delight in pointing out those parts of the full quotations which Pelagius had skipped
over, such as when Ambrose added, “Nor was the Church spotless from the beginning—this is
impossible for human nature.” 195 Then to Pelagius’ invocation of John of Constantinople on sin
not being a substance, Augustine can only agree, while reiterating the centrality of the distinction
between creation and redemption:
But our question is not about human nature as it is found in this life; our question is
rather about God’s grace by which it is healed through Christ the physician, whom it
would not need if it were healthy. And yet this man defends nature as if it were
healthy and as if the choice of the will were self-sufficient for being able not to sin. 196
As Augustine continues, the centrality of the means of grace is highlighted. He is repeatedly
happy to affirm statements about men becoming like God, having a pure heart, and being sons of
God, so long as it is clear that this is done by the grace of Jesus Christ the mediator, and by the
Holy Spirit who has been given to us. 197 This too is the case when he comes to his own work, De
Libero Arbitrio, from which Pelagius had quoted. Pelagius had quoted that section where
Augustine says that if the will cannot avoid evil, then it does not sin, “for who sins in a matter
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that can in no way be avoided?” In his response, Augustine seems to adjust his prior statement,
stating that whatever challenges the will faces, they can be resisted, for “we would not demand”
that the Father would lead us not into temptation “if we believed that we could not resist.” Then
returning to his theme, he says that “sin can be avoided, but it is avoided with the help of him
who cannot be deceived.” 198 Providing a fuller quote from his work, Augustine affirms that he
did exhort people to live good lives, but he also “did not destroy the grace of God without which
human nature cannot be enlightened and healed, once it has been plunged into darkness and
injured.” He then writes, “The whole dispute with these people turns on this point: that we do not
render meaningless the grace of God, which is found in Christ Jesus, our Lord, by a misguided
defense of nature.” 199 Burns understandably says that it is thus grace, and not sinlessness, that
Augustine sees as being at the heart of the Pelagian controversy. 200 And yet, given that Pelagius
affirmed a doctrine of grace, it is the nature of this grace as something in which we continually
participate and by which we are being redeemed that Augustine specifically wants to stress.
In completing our analysis of De Natura et Gratia, we can note that Augustine in his final
words shows an abiding concern for the “mediocre Christian.” His teaching, he hopes, will help
those Christians who are experiencing difficulty in their Christian lives to “persist in asking the
Lord with faith-filled and persevering prayers and with eager works of mercy.” He writes that he
is not so concerned about the erratic journey of healing and righteousness, but more that this can
only come about “by the grace of God through Jesus Christ, our Lord.” 201
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CHAPTER THREE
EXTRA NOS BUT NOT EXTRANEOUS
In the year 2000, a new edition of Peter Brown’s classic biography of Augustine was
released, with two new chapters by the author. In reflecting on the state of current Augustinian
studies, Brown wrote that “we want Augustine to talk to us now about sexuality and marriage,
not about grace and the Church.” 1 In the light of contemporary discussions on Augustinian grace
this seems to have been a premature judgment. In this chapter we will look at how the reading of
De Natura et Gratia brings concrete implications for discussions on nature and grace that wish to
be Augustinian today. Of course, a reading of just one treatise cannot hope to give the full
Augustinian picture of nature and grace. And yet it can help to identify the parameters of
Augustine’s approach, and the proposals which he explicitly rejects. In particular, we will
discuss how boundaries are important for Augustine in the Pelagian controversy, and yet he
never actually opposes nature to grace, seeking rather to affirm a continuity between the gifts of
God. The grace of God in Jesus Christ always comes extra nos, but is never extraneous to who
we are. For Augustine then, redemptive grace is different from the gift of creation. But it also
corresponds to our created nature in a way that prevents it from being, as Milbank put it, “no
more a gift than is a brick wall we might inadvertently run into.” 2
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Participation
Some contemporary approaches to nature and grace have considered Augustine’s
contribution to the debate relatively unimportant. Steven A. Long and Lawrence Feingold have
both recently written solid contributions to the theology of nature and grace, but have discussed
the matter in largely Thomistic terms. 3 This has prompted David Grummett recently, and rightly,
to ask, “Why has the notion that, for de Lubac, Augustine was less important than Thomas so
easily found acceptance?” 4 This thesis can be situated within the attempt to redress this
imbalance.
Some Augustinian scholarship had already been moving in the direction which Radical
Orthodoxy has moved. Peter Burnell, for example, has written in his The Augustinian Person
that for Augustine “though the inability to sin is a strictly divine attribute, human nature is
nevertheless incomplete until completed by it. The divine gifts constitute human nature’s
perfection and are not mere superadditions to it.” 5 But there are others who have sought to
engage, and criticize Radical Orthodoxy for the way in which it reads Augustine. These
criticisms will be useful for us in opening up the issue of what it means to be faithfully
Augustinian today.
In 2007 the journal Ars Disputandi ran a colloquium on Hanby’s Augustine and Modernity
in which Johannes Brachtendorf and Maarten Wisse wrote pieces somewhat appreciative, and
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yet largely critical of Hanby’s reading of Augustine. 6 Brachtendorf was especially forthright in
his critique.
The reader gets the impression that Hanby developed his thought construction
independently of Augustine and mined Augustine secondarily for particular
statements that he could use for his purposes. Hardly a central element in Hanby's
project truly stems from Augustine; much even contradicts the thought of the bishop. 7
Brachtendorf’s concern is that Hanby sees everything in metaphysical terms, neglecting
Augustine himself. We noted at the outside that Hanby’s lack of exegetical treatment was
problematic, and does leave him open to this kind of critique. His concern to read all of
Augustine through De Trinitate, or at least his own reading of De Trinitate, is too ambitious to
stand without proper attention to Augustine’s texts. But Brachtendorf’s somewhat visceral
response also vindicates the merits of Hanby’s challenge to Augustinian studies, for he is far
from being as unfaithful to Augustine as Brachtendorf makes him out to be. But Brachtendorf
does point out some areas where Hanby is lacking.
Whereas Augustine thinks of sanctification as a concrete, historical event—a call
issued in history beckoning the human who has turned away from God, Hanby casts
sanctification as a metaphysical datum that has always already determined the being
of humans. 8
This criticism is not, as we have seen, altogether unwarranted. In De Natura et Gratia, Augustine
showed his concern for matters of soteriology, and less for questions of the nature of being and
creation. To ignore this aspect of Augustine, or to subsume it into ontological concerns, misses
Augustine’s stress on the biblical language of healing through the blood of Christ crucified.
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Brachtendorf complains that by eliding nature and grace into a single economy, there is no
“outside” of the economy between the Father and the Son. 9
The Tübingen scholar Maarten Wisse offers a more nuanced, critical approach. He agrees
with Hanby’s rejection of the supposedly proto-Cartesian Augustine, denying a place for reading
Augustine as espousing a kind of autonomous consciousness. However, Wisse finds Hanby’s
language of “being in God” less helpful than his own suggested phrase, “being in relation with
God.” This is because the former underplays the ontological distinction between creature and
Creator. Indeed, Wisse has been committed to rejecting any kind of participationist ontology
with respect to Augustine, and has written a monograph in part rejecting Radical Orthodoxy’s
reading of Augustine called Trinitarian Theology Beyond Participation: Augustine’s De Trinitate
and Contemporary Theology. 10 While affirming the need to read Augustine systematically, Wisse
nevertheless seeks to develop a systematic Augustinianism in “almost the opposite form” to
Hanby. 11 Wisse stresses that while Augustine does see all being as participating in God in some
way, nevertheless there is still the possibility for Augustine of existing “outside Christ,” in direct
contrast to Radical Orthodoxy. 12 This is because the logic of creation is not identical to the logic
of God, and creation through the Word is different from recreation in Christ. Wisse understands
that his critique would thus bring a “death blow” to Radical Orthodoxy, because it would reject
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the central Radical Orthodoxy critique of nihilism by denying that all reality is grace. 13 Wisse has
developed this critique in another recent article, dissecting Radical Orthodoxy’s genealogy. For
Wisse, the Nouvelle Theologie received Augustine's theology through an “incarnational
ontological framework, which made it more compatible with a natural theology and a Thomistic
notion of analogy,” focusing especially on those aspects of Augustine's thought which “tend
towards the idea that the world bears traces of God's being and exists by participating in the
divine.” Regarding de Lubac, Wisse writes that “one can hardly say that he receives Augustine
on his own terms.” 14 Instead, de Lubac uses Augustine to criticize the scholastic neo-Thomism of
the early twentieth century and its separation of nature and supernature. 15 But Wisse’s criticism
has sustaining weight because he largely agrees with Radical Orthodoxy’s critique of the
impoverishment which Kantian metaphysics has had on modern theology. The irony of de Lubac
being accused of modernism by neo-scholastics and Pius XII is not lost on him:
The neo-Thomists attempted to respond to modernity through a Kantian
reinterpretation of a separation between nature and grace, sticking to an anti-Kantian
emphasis on the tenability of Aquinas’s five ways, thus proving the existence of God
apart from grace. They combined this form of natural theology with a strong stress on
the necessity of revelation and the mediatory role of the Church, which was the
reason they rejected forms of ‘Ontologism’, in which one would have access to God
without the salvific role of the Church.
De Lubac, however, saw a strong form of modernism in this approach, as it made the
world and all we know strictly secular, dependent only on our secular reason and
independent of any need for grace. For de Lubac, the separation of the natural and
supernatural was in severe contradiction with the tradition, Augustine, all the early
Christian writers, and also the medieval tradition. There is nothing that God created
that was not in itself already—think of Christ's role as mediator in creation—grace.
Salvific grace through the Church is the restoration of nature, it cannot merely be an

13

Wisse, “Was Augustine a Barthian?,” 18.

14

See also Bernard Mulcahy, who judges de Lubac's scholarship to be sometimes flawed, tending to be
“more broad than deep.” Bernard Mulcahy, Aquinas’s Notion of Pure Nature and the Christian Integralism of Henry
de Lubac (New York: Peter Lang, 2011), 147–48.
15

Wisse, “The First Modern Person?,” 110–11.

82

accidental addition to it. If something like ‘pure nature’ exists, then the typically
modern world with all its individualism and secularism is true, and the world as such
has no need for God. Then a world without God—de Lubac’s French world after the
revolution—is the real world. 16
As we have noted in the first chapter, however, the late de Lubac was not blind to the dangers of
participationist ontology which elided nature into grace. He approvingly cited Jacques Maritain’s
statement that “St Augustine taught as clearly as possible the ontological value of the distinction
between nature and grace.” 17 He recognized the Charybdis of the economy of separation, as well
as the Scylla of Platonist participation. 18 Rudolf Voderholzer puts it this way:
Both Augustinism and neo-scholasticism misjudge the paradoxical structure of
human nature. The Augustinians, with their identification of nature with grace, cannot
preserve the freedom of grace, while the adherents of the doctrine of natura pura,
with their separation of nature and grace, lose sight of the way human nature refers
back to God. De Lubac advocates not separating the two but making a distinction
between them: yet to distinguish in order to relate one to the other. 19
Our study has shown that it is Radical Orthodoxy, and Milbank in particular, which takes de
Lubac “further”, by attempting to resolve what de Lubac wished to maintain as a paradox, a
development to which Wisse does not do full justice. Wisse also tends to paint Hanby with a
Milbankian brush, something which we shall see is not completely justified. But his critique of
participationist ontology is nevertheless compelling.
In this aspect of Milbank’s Platonizing thought, there is a danger of almost returning full
circle to Pelagianism by affirming that the grace of God through Christ Jesus is already with us,
on account of our participation in God. Of course, for Pelagius, grace tended to be a gift
completely given in creation to an autonomous humanity, whereas for Radical Orthodoxy grace
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is a participatory gift, continually given and received. But nevertheless, both Pelagianism and
Radical Orthodoxy are in danger of sharing a rejection of any discrimination on God’s behalf.
Neither consider it possible to exist outside of God’s grace, even if grace is defined radically
differently. In contrast, Augustine considers the exclusivity of grace to be crucial. In a letter
against the semi-Pelagians, Augustine includes this rule of faith: “This gratuity is proved by the
distribution of grace: God does not give it to all, but to those whom He wills.” 20 Wisse’s
preferred term of “being in relation to God” thus allows for the Augustinian possibility of that
relationship being a negative one, even if it does flirt with acknowledging a modernist autonomy.
As Emil Brunner was to say in one the more recent flare-ups of the nature and grace controversy,
“sin itself is a relation to God: that of rebellion against the Creator, unbelief, ingratitude,
apostasy.” 21
To speak of man is to speak of God. Not that man is “divine”; but man is man
because he always stands in relation to God, either negatively or positively, and this
relation to God, in the negative or positive sense, is the key to the understanding of
man and the kernel of his being. Revelation is not something that is added to man's
being; it is there even when it is denied, rejected, and ignored.” 22
Wisse himself stands in this tradition and cites Brunner approvingly. While Brunner had agreed
with Karl Barth’s critique of a natural theology in which we can come to God independent of
revelation, he nevertheless argued for a “point of contact” (Anknüpfungspunkt) in human nature.
In Wisse’s summary of Brunner, “human beings have a natural sensitivity to revelation because
they have been created by God, and, therefore, always stand before God, even and precisely
when they deny this through sin.” 23 But Brunner goes even further than this, seeking to
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acknowledge that grace or revelation is not completely extraneous to who we are. In a section
called “Man and Revelation” of his Revelation and Reason, he writes:
If revelation is really encounter, then we cannot understand it without knowing
something of him to whom it is made. If revelation is God’s self-communication to
man, then it is of decisive importance to know the man to whom God communicates
Himself.
... This obvious point must be stressed, because a false interpretation of the sola
gratia, and the fear of Pelagian doctrine or of “synergism,” has led some theologians
to confuse the absolute receptivity of man in the revelation with an objective
passivity from which all human activity, as such, could be entirely eliminated. 24
Brunner is thus seeking to carve out room for seeing grace and revelation as actually taking hold
of something in man, and not being as unwelcome as a brick wall we might inadvertently run
into, while also seeking to affirm its exteriority and its discriminating exclusivity. In this line of
thinking, it is uncontroversial to say that all things are related to God. But it is equally
uncontroversial to say that all things are not thereby justified, made holy, or received into the
kingdom of God. But in the vision of theologians like Brunner and Wisse, relation to God is
essentially established with respect to grace. Whether it is positive or negative, relation is never
the same as participation because it is not with respect to nature. Radical Orthodoxy can tend to
the opposite pole, whereby it is essentially with respect to our created and graced nature that our
participation with God comes about. Thus the Radical Orthodoxy theologians John Milbank,
Catherine Pickstock and Graham Ward write the following:
The central theological framework of radical orthodoxy is ‘participation’ as
developed by Plato and reworked in Christianity, because any alternative
configuration perforce reserves a territory independent of God. The latter can lead
only to nihilism (though in different guises). Participation, however, refuses any
reserve of created territory, while allowing finite things their own integrity. 25
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While Radical Orthodoxy has looked to Augustine for this, Reinhard Hütter offers a
compelling challenge to this. In a characteristically authoritative article, he argues that John
Milbank and Henri de Lubac are best understood to be standing in an Origenist and Nyssan
tradition, despite their appeals to Augustine. The doctor of grace, rather, belongs to a different
historical tradition which sees the desire for God as needing to be elicited and which has stronger
ontological resources against universalism. 26 Rowan Williams is another theologian who, while a
friend of Radical Orthodoxy, also sees Augustine as representing that tradition which recognizes
the danger of seeing our nature as continuous with God’s grace, in that we neglect our right
stance of repentance and incapacity and treat God “as the fantasized completion of the self.” 27
Repentance—which goes further than thanksgiving or praise—is a necessary part of any
redemptive relationship with God, for it establishes the extra nos nature of the grace of Christ
Jesus.
[For Augustine,] instead of climbing up to Heaven to find the eternal Word, you have
to grasp that the eternal Word has come down from Heaven to find you. And this
happens when you see yourself not as a boldly questing intellectual mystic, but as a
sick person in desperate need of healing, someone whose reality cannot be completed
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gift to him of the earnest, as it were, of the free gift, he may conceive an ardent desire to inhere in his maker, and
may burn to enter upon the participation in that true light, that it may go well with him from Him to whom he owes
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by their own work and attainments but only by a relationship offered completely from
outside. 28
This repentant posture was something that Augustine had already come to stress in the
Donatist controversy, that purity was not earned but received. And his invocation of the Psalms
and prayer in De Natura et Gratia, along with a stress on the sickness and disordering of the will,
shows his continual fixation with this humility in the redemptive order before God. The practice
of repentance thus opens up a way of looking at participation in God but without the universalist
overtones of participationist ontology, and as a participation in God wrought in the realm of
redemption and not just creation. As Williams put it in a different context regarding Augustine,
“without accepting our radical difference from God, we cannot be united with God.” Union with
God for Augustine thus “never ceases to be the union of finite with infinite; it never becomes an
identity of substance.” 29 Charles Mathewes has written that Augustine’s anti-Pelagian theology
“was not a pessimistic centering insight into the vanity of human endeavour, but a joyous
celebration of the sovereignty of God's grace.” 30 But that is to oppose what must be held
together. Only in repentance can the sovereignty of God’s grace be celebrated. Only in
repentance, acknowledging as it does the possibility of existing outside of God’s grace, or in a
relationship of judgment, can a relationship of receptivity and joy in Christ take hold. 31

Observing Boundaries
Hans Boersma has been another critic of Radical Orthodoxy’s reading of Augustine, along
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somewhat similar lines as Wisse’s critique of its participationist ontology. In a perceptive article,
he finds that despite some similarities, Radical Orthodoxy, as revealed in the writings of Milbank
and Ward especially, and Augustine are “fundamentally at odds” with one another. While
Boersma agrees that Augustine is not modern, he also stresses that neither is he postmodern, but
rather premodern. So while Augustine does see created reality as participating in a cosmic order,
that order “has borders that are defined and maintained by God.” Reinhard Hütter has made a
similar criticism:
Where everything is grace all the way down in one and the same way, albeit of
infinitely differing intensity, everything that has been brought into being, must have
its end in God, by necessary ontological entailment. While undoubtedly a grandiose
speculative vision, it, however, is neither the teaching of the Scriptures nor of the
Church. 32
Our reading of De Natura et Gratia confirms Boersma’s and Hütter’s assessment here, and
reveals Milbank’s project to be perhaps postmodern and critical, but not Augustinian. As we
have seen, at the center of Augustine’s argument is the distinction between God the creator and
God the savior, as is his desire to attribute different work to these different actions of the one
God. 33 The problem of a participationist ontology for Boersma is that there are no boundaries or
meaningful distinctions. Radical Orthodoxy works instead “with a postmodern understanding of
reality as human construct—its “ontology of peace”—in which boundaries and identities are at
the very least always in flux (perhaps even nonexistent) and always dependent on human powers
of persuasion.” 34 This approach can be seen, Boersma argues, in the fruit of Radical Orthodoxy’s
“antinomian moral theology, particularly in its inability to give guidance in terms of sexual
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ethics and in its hesitancy to acknowledge the legitimacy of the use of force in defense of
valuable temporal ends.” 35 It is not surprising that in a different article from a year earlier,
Boersma raises real questions as to the possibility of any Reformed dialogue with Radical
Orthodoxy at all, given Milbank’s tenuous articulation of truth as merely that which is persuasive
and also his general disregard of the Reformation and its heirs. 36 In his more programmatic 2006
article, he continues,
This participatory ontology amounts to a radical denial of any kind of immanentism
in which the created order and human reason take on independence vis-à-vis the
Trinitarian life of God. Creation and human reason are only real insofar as they
participate in the divine life. 37
He goes on:
Milbank even ends up with a denial of the Creator/creature distinction: He bases the
obliteration of boundaries in the Incarnation, that is to say, in the violation of the
“boundary between created and creator, immanence and transcendence, humanity and
God.” 38
It should be noted here that in the work from which Boersma is citing, Milbank does further on
say that God did obliterate the Creator/creature division, “however, in doing so, he also
preserved [the division].”39 Indeed, whether Radical Orthodoxy is in danger of a Monophysite
Christology remains something of an open question. Eliding nature and grace does not
necessarily correspond to eliding, or failing to distinguish between, the two natures of Christ. 40
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And the “elision” of which Radical Orthodoxy speaks, at least in Hanby, is not so much an
obliteration as an ordering. Thus Hanby writes that a “proper Augustinian response to the divine
voice is not a flight from the temporal, but a proper referral of the temporal to its eternal origin
and end.” 41 Milbank’s qualification about preserving the division appears to be an attempt to
acknowledge the necessary distinctions within Scriptural theology. But Boersma rightly argues
that the overarching framework of Radical Orthodoxy works against such boundaries. Picking up
Hütter’s analysis, we could say that its Origenist tradition brings with it a universalism that is
hard to escape. Thus Boersma goes on to note that the result of the eradication of boundaries can
be seen in Graham Ward’s claim that “from Augustine I take the insight that we need to suspend
judgment concerning other faiths.” 42 This nonsensical statement again shows how in seeking to
oppose Pelagian autonomy with all of its might, Radical Orthodoxy can fall into a kind of
Pelagian non-discriminatory anthropology in which all are already, and equally, graced by means
of the gift of creation. As Pelagius put it in De Natura,
What is human nature to do but believe in the God who made heaven and earth, the
God whom it naturally perceives as its maker, and, by living correctly, fulfills his
will, though it has not received any instruction in the faith concerning the suffering
and resurrection of Christ? 43
It is not hard to hear, in opposition to Ward and the universalism of Radical Orthodoxy,
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Augustine’s cry in De Natura et Gratia that this would render the cross of Christ void. 44
In looking at the dangers of Radical Orthodoxy going full-circle on Pelagianism, there is
another aspect that we might note. As we saw in De Natura et Gratia Augustine had intuited that
Pelagius’ treatment of nature seemed to allow no distinction between the baptized elect and those
not baptized. If all of human nature has been graced, what is the point of baptism? Because
Pelagius spoke so positively of human nature, Augustine could ask: “Are those who are not yet
baptized not included in human nature?” 45 Pelagius had a hard time dealing with baptism,
because his theological vision tended to deal in more universal categories. We can see this in the
errors for which Caelestius was condemned in Carthage in 411. As we have noted, the
condemned articles were: 1. Adam had to die; 2. Adam's sin injured him alone; 3. Infants are
born in pre-Fall state; 4. “Adam by his death [or by his sin] does not subject the whole human
race to death; [because] Christ by His Resurrection does not give new life to the entire human
race.” 46 Regarding this fourth point, Pelagian theology inferred that the sinfulness of the world
was evidence that the resurrection had not brought new life to all, and so also then the sin of
Adam could not have stained all. If Adam’s sin has affected the entire human race, as Augustine
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had claimed, why has not the redemption of Christ therefore redeemed all of humanity? Is
Augustine saying that the power of Adam was greater than that of Christ? That sin’s power is
stronger and more pervasive than Christ’s? Thus as Bonner has written, the “Pelagians” “had no
characteristic theology, other than a denial of any transmission of Original Sin.” 47 Faced with the
dilemma of Adam’s universality and Christ’s limited influence, they resolved the tension by
limiting both. Milbank is keenly aware of this dilemma too, and yet resolves it in the opposite,
but nevertheless mirrored, way to the Pelagians. That is, rather than treat Adam’s sin and Christ’s
resurrection as limited, Milbank treats both as cosmically present so that Christ’s resurrection
claims everyone, as all were created through Him and for Him. As Milbank put it: “After all,
how could charis be a less original or plenitudinous gift than esse?” 48 But we can remember that
Augustine in De Natura et Gratia, in seeing sin as a lack which distorts our will, considers grace
to be something resisted by the natural man, who has lost his appetite for fulfillment in a
completely different way to how God brings us into being from nothing. 49 A key text here is 1
Cor. 15:21-2: For as by a man came death, by a man has come also the resurrection of the dead.
For as in Adam all die, so also in Christ shall all be made alive. But the following verse is
instructive also: But each in his own order: Christ the firstfruits, then at his coming those who
belong to Christ. In the context of the cosmic, objective victory of Christ, St. Paul nevertheless
sets a boundary regarding those who belong to Christ. The scandal of particularity must establish
an ontology of boundaries which Radical Orthodoxy has rejected and thus remains skewed. As
we have noted, Hanby thinks that distinguishing God’s actions threatens his divine
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immutability. 50 He has also noted that he regards the question of predestination “as at best a
secondary concern.” 51 But that is in danger of siding with the Pelagians, against Augustine,
whom Boersma is right to argue held to an ontology of participation with boundaries. We need
only recall the two cities of De civitate Dei—according to which there are “no more than two
kinds of groups of human beings, which we call two cities, according to the special usage of our
Scriptures,”—and the stress on faith in the Pelagian controversy— “faith itself sets a believer
apart from one who does not believe”—to see how important boundaries were for his theology. 52
Regarding this participationist ontology of Radical Orthodoxy, Boersma is happier than
Wisse to describe Augustine as subscribing to a participatory ontology, and one that is not only
with reference to grace (whether the relation be positive or negative) but also with respect to
creation. But he draws the interesting point that for Augustine, we do not so much emanate from
God in a Platonic fashion, but rather come into being from nothing, creatio ex nihilo. He cites
Augustine from De civitate Dei: “The things he made are good because they were made by him,
but they are subject to change because they were made not out of his being but out of nothing.” 53
This twofold character supports reading Augustine as observing a strong ontological distinction
between the creature and the Creator. And just because all creation is a gift of God does not
necessarily entail that creation and grace are the same gift. 54
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In his fascinating reply to Brachtendorf and Wisse as part of the Ars Disputandi
colloquium, Hanby acknowledged that in Augustine and Modernity he may have opened himself
up to the charge that because creation is grace it is sufficient unto itself for salvation. Indeed his
whole response implicitly distances himself from Milbank, and seems to be a clearer expression
of Hanby’s settled and considered opinions rather than those in Augustine and Modernity which
were written under the supervision of Milbank. While not disputing that creation is grace, Hanby
now adds that it is not “the remedial grace necessary to draw humanity to God from its fallen
state.” Hanby affirms instead that creatures are “inherently and naturally ordered from the outset
to what only God can finally give them, that they are made to receive God as gift.” 55 While
Hanby nevertheless states that Augustine and Modernity stands as his “final thoughts” on the
matter, his reaction piece does show a definite move away from Milbank’s participationist
ontology, something which is by no means obvious in Augustine and Modernity. 56 Hanby does
observe boundaries here in a way that he was less explicit about in Augustine and Modernity. He
states that the saved human being receives God as a gift, acknowledging that there is the
possibility of an intelligible existence prior to the gift of salvation. This does differentiate him
from Milbank (although Hanby does not acknowledge it), for whom, as we can recall
“Christianity should not draw boundaries,” 57 and:
the divine gift ... is a gift to no-one, but rather establishes creatures as themselves
gifts, the divine gift passes across no neutral abyss, no interval of uncertainty during
which one waits, with bated breath, to see if the destiny of a gift will be realised. 58
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Now, in 2007, Hanby writes of the “significant differences between those writing under the
auspices of this [Radical Orthodoxy book] series.” 59 And while Hanby does not explicitly
concede any ground, he shows an approach much closer to Boersma and, as our study has
shown, Augustine. He explains, for instance, that by eliding nature and grace into a single
economy, he did not mean to collapse the distinction between them, but rather to affirm with
Augustine in De Natura et Gratia that God’s justice is consistent, whether in saving or
damning. 60
The question, then, is not whether there is a difference between God and the world,
whether nature has a legitimate freedom or autonomy, or even whether the world in
its freedom, autonomy, and being not-God has the capacity to remain indifferent or
resistant to divine solicitations. Of course it does; it would be blindness to claim
otherwise, and in fact, I never do. Rather the question—for my critics and, I argue,
for Augustine against the Pelagians—is whether it is this indifference and this
capacity for resistance that constitutes the world in its very worldliness, whether the
‘legitimate autonomy’ of the world consists in this indifference and resistance, or
rather whether the world and its autonomy find their fulfillment in relation to God
because this fulfillment answers to their original, intrinsic constitution as creatures. 61
In this clarifying passage, Hanby both acknowledges the essential importance of boundaries,
while also drawing attention to what he still sees in Brachtendorf and Wisse as “evidence of the
deep modern anachronisms infecting much of the contemporary treatment of Augustine.” 62
Exploring this disagreement will take us to the final section of this thesis.

Is Nature and Grace a Zero-Sum Game?
Hanby’s response to Brachtendorf and Wisse shows a desire both to uphold boundaries and
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deny universalism and yet nevertheless preserve a participationist ontology in which creatures
are still ordered towards God, and in which God and humanity do not stand in competition with
each other. That Wisse and Brachtendorf do not see this is, for Hanby, the “fundamental
disagreement,” and leads to them (along with much contemporary Augustinian scholarship)
projecting a modernist metaphysic back on to Augustine in a way that diminishes his thought. 63
Hanby thus agrees with Wisse that Augustine rightly insists upon “the absolute ontological
difference between God and the world,” but also then wants to add, contra Wisse, that:
throughout the Pelagian controversy [Augustine] insists that every human act which
can finally be called ‘good’ is at once the work of the creature and the Creator, that
there is no moment at which the human contribution to this act can be held in a state
of reserve as its own private possession, separate from the gift of grace. 64
Or, to frame it in different terms, Hanby wants to establish ontological principles for Augustine
which are neither Stoic or Pelagian on the one hand, in which nature and operative grace exist in
competition and man’s nature is defined by his isolation from God making grace a violent
intrusion, but neither Origenist or Platonic on the other hand, in which ontological boundaries are
collapsed into emanation and which is ultimately universalistic. Hanby’s response is so
important to his whole project because he here clearly, and rightly, rejects Milbank’s boundaryless Christianity, while also, rightly, sticking to his earlier guns in challenging some of
contemporary Augustinian studies’ modernist, zero-sum game approach to God and man, or
nature and grace. In doing this, Hanby employs the Incarnational analogy:
For there is a deep analogy between the question of how an act can be at once divine
and human without compromising the difference between God and the world and the
question of how the Son can become incarnate without sacrificing genuine divinity or
humanity, even if there remains an infinite difference between Christ our Head and
us, his Body—a difference I adamantly affirm. Or put differently, if one can offer a
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coherent account of how the Son could become incarnate without violating either his
divinity or humanity, one can offer a coherent account of how the graced act could be
at once God’s and mine, and more finally and fully the latter for being the former. 65
With reference to our own study of Augustine’s De Natura et Gratia, Hanby here offers a
compelling vision for understanding the logic behind Augustine’s anti-Pelagian concerns. As we
noted, Augustine was concerned to prevent nature and grace from being seen to exist only in
competition, as a zero-sum game.
[W]e do not take away the choice of the will, but we proclaim the grace of God. Who
benefits from all these things, unless they are willing? But they must be willing with
humility and not raise themselves up with pride over the powers of the will, as if it
alone were sufficient for the perfection of righteousness. 66
As we have seen, Augustine would come to summarize De Natura et Gratia in the Retractiones
as a work in which he “did not defend grace in opposition to nature, but the grace by which
nature is set free and ruled.” 67 Indeed within Augustine’s thought there are indications that both
Pelagianism and Platonism suffer from a similar disease. The Pelagians make nature grace, and
the Platonists make grace natural. 68 This is the choice that John Milbank had posed, identifying
the former with German theology, and the latter with his favored French theology. 69 But Hanby
points to a more helpful way:
It is this dissimilarity [between God and the world], this ontological discontinuity, the
fact that God is not really but freely and contingently related to the world that makes
it possible to think of both the incarnation, and by analogy, a doctrine of grace that at
once constitutes, perfects, and completes nature in its very naturality while remaining
entirely distinct and gratuitous. Were I now to argue this independently of Augustine,
I would take recourse to the Thomist distinction between the esse ipsum subsistens of
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God himself and the esse creatum non subsistens of the world to account for how we
might think of the world as being at once possessed of its own being while being
nonetheless intrinsically constituted in relation to God and dependent for its
fulfillment as world on the gift of grace. And it is on this basis that I would contend,
perhaps more strongly than I did in the book, for a genuine sense of creaturely,
human—and by extension, philosophical—‘autonomy’, founded not in a fictional
independence from God, but rather precisely in its embrace of its need for and
dependence upon God. 70
Hanby’s response thus rehabilitates his project with valuable corrections against the Milbankian
extremes, while also denying, along with Augustine, that the relationship of nature to grace is a
zero-sum game. While Pelagius had assumed man is naturally free, for Augustine it was God’s
grace which made our wills cling to God and so find freedom. 71 Nature was, without grace,
directed away from God, even opposed to him, and enslaved to sin. 72 The grace of Christ Jesus,
won on the cross, is in no way within us. And yet, it does lead to our freedom, even to the
fullness of our being, strengthening and activating our nature, without replacing it. Grace never
threatens our deepest nature, or compromises our freedom but rather enables it. Because the two
do not exist in competition, the gift of grace can be fully undeserved, unmerited and unexpected,
while also being more welcome than a brick wall which we might inadvertently run into. Grace
is extra nos, but not extraneous to our natures which are set free by grace when we receive it
through faith. The victory of Augustine over Pelagius, then, was not necessarily a victory of
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grace over nature, nor a full elision of the two. 73 Nor was it just about grace, per se, given that
Pelagius could affirm that it is by grace that we are forgiven by Jesus Christ, especially in
baptism. 74 In this sense Hanby is indeed right to see that it was not just grace, but the ontological
foundation of God’s economy of creation and grace which was at the heart of the controversy.
We earlier noted one paradox of Augustine's anthropology, namely, of subjectivity leading to
objectivity. Here there is another paradox which de Lubac too affirmed, namely that freedom is
not intrinsic to our nature but is received as, by grace, it submits to God. This allows us to read
Augustine intelligibly, in contrast to the confusion Gerald Bonner has when he writes of “two
distinct theologies” in Augustine which he reads as opposing each other. The first is that of
participation in God’s life, the other of pessimism regarding the human condition to perform
anything at all. 75 But a proper understanding of nature and grace not only harmonizes these two
supposedly distinct theologies, but brings them into an essential relationship with each other.
Recalling the work of Henri de Lubac with which this study began, we can see Hanby as
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sharing in a similar pattern—reacting strongly against the modernist dualisms in Augustinian
studies as well as more generally in political and religious life, only to see later on more clearly
the dangers of the postmodern collapsing of distinctions and boundaries. Hanby’s stress in 2007
on the importance of dissimilarity and ontological discontinuity in Augustine mirrors de Lubac’s
own mature rejection of both ‘contingentist theories’ and Platonist theories. It is worth re-quoting
de Lubac here, citing Jacques Maritain:
Despite all that has been said to the contrary, we must certainly maintain that ‘St
Augustine taught as clearly as possible the ontological value of the distinction
between nature and grace’; ‘he clearly affirmed that distinction even for the state of
innocence’. The definitely and intrinsically supernatural character of divine adoption
is one of the fundamental elements in his teaching; it is expressed there so clearly,
and so insistently, that we should be astonished to find that it has not always been
recognized. 76
In light of passages like this, it is hard to imagine de Lubac approving of Milbank as the
interpreter of his Augustinian thought. A faithful reading of de Lubac will remember him not
only as the one who challenged the idea of natura pura but also as one who rejected the
collapsing of distinctions between nature and grace, especially if attributed to Augustine. Does
Augustine simply stand as a wax nose in these debates, able to lend the authority of the
“Augustinian” tag in whichever way someone wishes to coopt him? It is hard to deny that the
contested space of what is genuinely Augustinian sometimes tends to reflect the theological and
confessional commitments of its challengers. Approaches to Augustine which sideline the
“exegetical” will only perpetuate this error. But that is not to say that the Augustinian “exegetes”
always get him right. As Hanby has convincingly shown, in order to understand Augustine on
nature and grace, one must give full attention to the broader ontological visions of Augustine and
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Lubac, The Mystery of the Supernatural, 26–27.
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Pelagius.
Against Milbank and other Platonic sympathizers, Augustine is clear in De Natura et
Gratia that faulty attempts to defend God’s creation as fully graced end up rejecting the cross
and the mercy of the physician. “Hence, we should not praise the creator so that we are forced to
say, indeed so that we are found guilty of saying, that the savior is unnecessary (superfluum).” 77
The savior is always necessary because our redemption can only come by a grace that is extra
nos, and different from the created gift. But against those who would see Augustine as positing a
natural autonomy that is fully intelligible without reference to grace, a natura pura, Augustine in
De Natura et Gratia also bears witness to a non-competitive relationship between nature and
grace. In this relationship, nature is set free by grace. In its lack caused by sin, nature reveals
grace to be not extraneous or superfluous but its fulfilment. 78
.

77
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